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The term "separation of powers" appears nowhere in the Constitution.
Nevertheless, the division of federal authority among three distinct but interde-
pendent branches is one of the defining features of the American governmental
system. Although designed to promote both liberty and efficiency, this structure
affords ample opportunity for interbranch conflict. Perhaps because, as de Toc-
queville presciently observed, "[s]carcely any political question arises in the
United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question,"' the
Supreme Court recently has addressed an unusually large number of disputes
concerning the respective powers of Congress and the President.2 This has oc-
curred even though the New Deal apparently had transformed the seemingly
arcane subject of separation of powers into a topic of primarily antiquarian
interest.3
The renewed attention to the problem of government structure was largely
stimulated by three cases that arose from the Watergate affair. The first,
United States v. Nixon,4 upheld the validity of the special prosecutor's subpoena
to the President for tape recordings of White House conversations relating to
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2. The relationship between Congress and the President has not been the only aspect of government struc-
ture that has occupied the Court's attention during this period. Two other problems also have generated significant
litigation. The first relates to the constitutionality of assigning the power to adjudicate legal claims to tribunals
whose members lack the tenure and salary protections enjoyed by article III judges. In Northern Pipeline Constr.
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), the Court, with three dissents and no majority opinion,
invalidated a statutory provision conferring jurisdiction over all matters arising under the bankruptcy laws upon
article I judges. In Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985), the Court upheld the
assignment of a limited class of disputes under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act to
mandatory arbitration, subject to judicial review only for "fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct," 7
U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D)(ii) (1982). The Thomas decision was unanimous, although the opinion of the Court
attracted only a bare majority of the Justices. And in Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S.
833 (1986). a seven-member majority subscribing to a single opinion upheld an administrative regulation permit-
ting adjudication of state law counterclaims in agency reparation proceedings. See generally Fallon, Of Legislative
Courts. Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REv. 916 (1988); Saphire & Solimine, Shoring
Up Article III: Legislative Court Doctrine in the Post CFTC v. Schor Era, 68 B.U.L. REv. 85 (1988).
Another line of cases addresses the problem of federalism and the role of the states in our constitutional
system. In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), the Court ruled that the tenth amendment
prevented Congress from applying federal wage and hour regulations to public employees at the state and local
level who were engaged in traditional government functions. After less than a decade during which the Court
steadily narrowed the reach of this principle, the decision was overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). See generally Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for
a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10-22 (1988); Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH.
L. REv. 1709, 1712-33 (1985).
3. See Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REv. 421, 437-52 (1987).
4. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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the illegal entry into the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee
in June 1972, a ruling that led ineluctably to Mr. Nixon's resignation from
office two weeks later. The next case, Buckley v. Valeo,5 held unconstitutional
the process for selecting members of the Federal Election Commission, an
agency created as part of the statutory reforms passed in the wake of perceived
fund-raising abuses in President Nixon's 1972 reelection campaign. The third,
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,6 rejected a facial challenge to the
constitutionality of a statute depriving Mr. Nixon of control of his presidential
papers.
Separation of powers disputes have continued to occupy a central place on
the Court's docket during this decade. Among the more notable cases have been
those invalidating the legislative veto' and the central feature of a highly publi-
cized effort to reduce the federal deficit,8 and another upholding the indepen-
dent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act.9 Although these deci-
sions have generated controversy, they have not provoked constitutional and
political crises."0
Nevertheless, this line of cases has left us in an unsatisfactory position. The
Court has failed to articulate a consistent methodology for analyzing separation
of powers disputes involving the legislative and executive branches. Sometimes
it follows a formal approach analogous to the "'strict' in theory and fatal in
fact" scrutiny in equal protection cases.1 At other times it uses a more func-
tional approach focusing upon checks and balances. During the 1980s, the selec-
tion of the analytical method has determined the outcome of every legislative-
executive controversy. The inconsistencies in outcomes and methodology are
hardly unique to separation of powers problems,"2 but they suggest the need for
greater analytical clarity than the Court thus far has demonstrated.
At a more fundamental level, the quest for ultimate judicial resolution of
constitutional turf battles between Congress and the President has undesirable
consequences for the nation as a whole. Separation of powers disputes implicate
fundamental questions respecting the role of government, questions that rarely
receive detailed attention in Supreme Court opinions. Excessive reliance upon
5. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
6. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
7. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); see also Consumers Union of
U.S., Inc. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en bane) (per curiam), affid mem. sub nom. United States
Senate v. FTC, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983); Consumer Energy Council v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd
mem. sub noma. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983).
8. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
9. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988). The relevant portions of the Ethics in Government Act are
codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (Supp. V 1987).
10. See Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish Incon-
sistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 488, 489 (1987).
11. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
12. A notable illustration in a more contentious area involves the display of religious symbols on public
property. Compare Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (allowing cr ehe with secular decorations) with
County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989) (disallowing unadorned
craeche but permitting menorah). See generally Marshall, "We Know It When We See It"[:] The Supreme Court
and Establishment, 59 S. CAL L. REV. 495 (1986).
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the Court deceives us into thinking that these disputes are purely constitutional
in nature and that only the Justices can resolve them. Demanding judicial reso-
lution improperly diminishes the role of the political branches in interpreting
the Constitution, and emphasizing the constitutionality of a proposal diverts at-
tention from its often dubious wisdom.
The limited utility of judicial review in legislative-executive conflicts has
been demonstrated numerous times. For example, the courts played no role in
the controversy over the Tenure of Office Act,13 probably the most severe sepa-
ration of powers problem in our history. Indeed, congressional concerns about
the constitutionality of that statute contributed to the acquittal of Andrew
Johnson in the only presidential impeachment trial ever conducted by the Sen-
ate.14 The Act was amended in 1869 during the first weeks of the Grant admin-
istration and repealed, after perfunctory debate, in 1887 by a Congress which
recognized the unfortunate experiment as the great national embarrassment
that it was.15
Similarly, the judiciary has served as a bystander throughout the contro-
versy over the War Powers Resolution.' That measure was passed in 1973 to
prevent a repetition of what was widely regarded as the unilateral executive
commitment of American military forces to the war in Southeast Asia."7 No
President has accepted its validity, although several have submitted reports to
Congress in apparent compliance with its terms.18 At the same time, the legisla-
tive branch has scrupulously avoided invocation of the Resolution in every situa-
13. Ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430 (1867), amended by Act of Apr. 5, 1869, Ch. 10, 16 Stat. 6, repealed by Act of
Mar. 3. 1887, Ch. 353, 24 Stat. 500. The Supreme Court retroactively condemned the Act as unconstitutional
approximately 40 years after its repeal. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926).
14. The votes of seven Republican Senators, otherwise opponents of the President, were essential to John-
son's acquittal. These Senators voted to acquit at least in part out of concern that the Tenure of Office Act
violated the Constitution. E. FONER, RECONSTRUCTION 336 (1988); H. TREFOUSSE, ANDREW JOHNSON 330-31
(1989).
15. See Entin, The Removal Power and the Federal Deficit: Form. Substance, and Administrative Indepen-
dence, 75 Ky. Li. 699, 722-23 (1987).
16. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982).
17. In fact, Congress approved presidential action in the region when it passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution
in August 1964. H.RJ. Res. 1145, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 78 Stat. 384 (1964), repealed by Act of Jan. 12, 1971,
Pub. L. No. 91-672, § 12, 84 Stat. 2053, 2055. Thereafter the executive branch asserted that the Resolution
served as the functional equivalent of a congressional declaration of war. See, e.g., Office of the Legal Adviser,
Department of State, The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Viet Nam, 75 YALE Li. 1085,
1102-06 (1966).
18. See HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG. 2D SEsS. THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION 169-
254 (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter HOUSE STUDY]; Carter. The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolu-
tion, 70 VA. L. REV. 101, 104-07 (1984); Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs:
Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE Li. 1255, 1260 & nn.14-15 (1988); Comment, The War Powers
Resolution After Fifteen Years: A Reassessment, 38 AM. U.L REV. 141, 160-62 (1988).
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tion in which it seemed to apply.19 Court rulings have neither undermined this
measure nor stimulated recent proposals to amend it.20
Finally, Watergate itself suggests the limits of judicial review in separation
of powers disputes between the political branches. It is true that the Supreme
Court decision in the Nixon tapes case led directly to President Nixon's resigna-
tion from office. That decision was not the only factor in that process, though.
Simultaneously, the House Judiciary Committee was conducting an inquiry that
culminated in the voting of three articles of impeachment against the President.
While members of Congress might have preferred to await the Court's ruling,
the impeachment process probably would have led to the same denouement even
in the absence of the parallel judicial proceeding."'
The emphasis upon the limited utility of judicial resolution of separation of
powers disputes between the political branches is addressed primarily to elected
officials, lawyers, and citizens. It suggests that less reliance upon litigation could
promote more intelligent public policymaking by creating incentives for reason-
able accommodation of conflicting viewpoints. Following the course recom-
mended in this Article would not be a panacea. This approach involves the crea-
tion of necessary, not sufficient, conditions for more effective governance and
politics.
At the same time, the discussion has implications for courts called upon to
resolve interbranch separation of powers disputes. Some commentators, most
notably Dean Choper, have suggested that the judiciary refrain from deciding
constitutional conflicts between Congress and the President.12 This approach
would require substantial revision of the political question doctrine 23 and would
uphold interbranch accommodatiops that contravened express textual provisions
of the Constitution. A less extreme analysis would defer to arrangements de-
vised by Congress and the President provided that those arrangements were
consistent with the constitutional text. The goal would be to discourage litiga-
tion by persuading the political branches that resort to the judicial process
would rarely succeed. This in turn might create incentives for the legislature
and the executive to assess the stakes of their disputes more realistically and to
19. See HOUSE STUDY, supra note 18, at 224, 227, 234-36, 242-43, 252-53; Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted
a War Powers Act That Worked, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1379, 1380-81 (1988). On occasion, the legislative and
executive branches have negotiated a compromise to avoid invocation of the Resolution. For example, a 1983 joint
resolution, rather than the procedures specified in the War Powers Resolution, authorized the deployment of U.S.
Marines in Lebanon for up to 18 months. Multinational Force in Lebanon, Pub. L. No. 98-119, 97 Stat. 805
(1983) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (Supp. V 1987)). See also Sofaer, The War Powers Resolution: Fifteen
Years Later, 62 TEmp. L. REV. 317, 326 (1989).
20. See Ely, supra note 19, at 1383-85; Comment, supra note 18, at 171-73.
21. See Gunther, Judicial Hegemony and Legislative Autonomy: The Nixon Case and the Impeachment
Process, 22 UCLA L. REV. 30 (1974).
22. J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 263 (1980); see id. at 260-379.
23. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 573, 621 n.194 (1984). Such a development seems undesirable for the reason stated in the text.
For a contrary view, see Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 97, 162-75
(1988).
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fashion workable solutions that would promote both free and responsible
government. 2.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the allocation of powers in
the Constitution, surveying both the text and the historical reasons for that allo-
cation. Part II examines the jurisprudence of separation of powers, with particu-
lar reference to the legislative-executive conflicts of the past fifteen years. This
discussion focuses less upon finding the "correct" approach in such cases than
upon the inherent difficulties with any unitary formula. Part III considers the
consequences of the recent separation of powers debate and explores the limita-
tions of judicial review in this field.
I. THE ALLOCATION OF POWERS IN THE CONSTITUTION
The principle of separation of powers may be said to "define the very char-
acter of the American political system,"25 but giving precise content to this
principle has not proved easy. For Justice Brandeis, the concept afforded an
essential safeguard against tyranny: "The doctrine of the separation of powers
was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to pre-
clude the exercise of arbitrary power." 26 For Justice Jackson, it facilitated re-
sponsible governance: "While the Constitution diffuses power the better to se-
cure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed
powers into a workable government. 12 7 Ironically, these judicial statements
serve as premises for legal conclusions that might seem counterintuitive to the
casual reader.28 That fact should caution against reliance upon mechanistic for-
mulas in this field.
24. The recommendation against reliance upon judicial resolution of separation of powers disputes between
Congress and the President does not necessarily apply to other constitutional issues. The rationale for the recom-
mendation in this context is that the legislative and executive branches generally have ample resources with which
to protect themselves. That is not true, for example, in individual rights cases, in which the party asserting a
constitutional violation frequently lacks meaningful access to the political process as a means of self-defense.
Similarly, this rationale may not apply in federalism disputes. To be sure, the Supreme Court has suggested
that the structure of federal polities protects state interests and therefore obviates the need for judicial enforce-
ment of the tenth amendment. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547-55 (1985). Nu-
merous critics have pointed out that this reasoning exaggerates the extent to which the states are protected against
federal encroachment. See, e.g., id. at 564-67 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 587-88 (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
Merritt, supra note 2, at 15-17. Even if these criticisms understate the protection that the states enjoy in national
polities, see Hero, The U.S. Congress and American Federalism: Are 'Subnational' Governments Protected?, 42
W. PoL Q. 93, 103 (1989), it remains true that the states do not directly participate in the federal government. By
contrast, Congress and the President are the principal actors in a broad array of federal activities.
25. G. WooD. THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 151 (1969). Indeed, the principle
of separation of powers was "the characteristic that distinguished our system from all others conceived up to the
time of our Constitution." Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 507 (1977) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
26. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
27. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring in the
judgment).
28. The quotation from Justice Brandeis occurs in the final paragraph of a 55-page opinion rejecting a
separation of powers argument. The quotation from Justice Jackson comes near the beginning of a 22-page opin-
ion upholding a separation of powers challenge to a presidential emergency action taken during wartime. The two
statements are less inconsistent than the text implies, however. Both suggest that the President lacks unfettered
inherent authority in the performance of his duties.
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Understanding the concept of separation of powers requires consideration
both of the text of the Constitution and of its background. The next sections
survey the circumstances that prompted dissatisfaction with the Articles of
Confederation, examine the distribution of federal powers among the branches,
and review the reasons that led the framers to that distribution.
A. The Central Government Under Confederation
The Constitutional Convention culminated years of dissatisfaction with
government under the Articles of Confederation. From the time that the Arti-
cles were ratified in 1781, the national government lacked the power to deal
with fiscal, diplomatic, and related challenges to its sovereignty. The absence of
coercive authority contributed significantly to the demise of that regime. In-
deed, unhappiness with the Articles existed almost from the beginning and pro-
posals for reform were advanced within months of their adoption. 9
The Confederation faced critical financial problems throughout its exis-
tence. Shortly after the ratification of the Articles, the Continental Congress
passed an impost to raise enough money to pay its expenses. The Congress
could not compel the states to accept this levy, and by the fall of 1782 several
had rejected it.30 With the Revolutionary War effectively over but peace negoti-
ations languishing, the army went unpaid and became increasingly disaffected.
Congress thereupon adopted another unsuccessful impost, although enough
money came in to give the troops one month's pay in cash and three in certifi-
cates. That incomplete payment mollified the armed forces for the moment.3'
The wolf remained close to the door, however. By 1786, the new nation
faced bankruptcy. Three years after passage of the last impost, such leading
states as New York were continuing to refuse to pay levies for purposes that
they could not control.32 Tax revenues barely sufficed to meet current expenses,
and debt service payments exceeding a million dollars annually loomed on the
horizon. 3
The Confederation faced equally daunting challenges on the diplomatic
and military fronts. Several states ignored their obligations under the Treaty of
Paris to respect British claims against American debtors and property. Some,
notably New York, also passed discriminatory laws against former Tories.
Faced with the new nation's apparent inability to comply with the Treaty, Eng-
land refused to surrender its military outposts in the Northwest Territory.34 In
addition, the British government continued to impose restrictions upon Ameri-
can navigation. The Continental Congress sought authority to respond to those
restrictions but divisions among the states prevented an effective, timely, and
29. A. MCLAUGHLIN. THE CONFEDERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 1783-1789, at 119, 121 (Collier Books
ed. 1962).
30. A. Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 32-33 (1987); Elkins & MeKitrick, The Founding Fa-
thers(:I Young Men of the Revolution, 76 PoL SCI. Q. 181, 207 (1961).
31. A. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 29, at 50-58; Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 30, at 207.
32. A. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 29, at 63-64; Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 30, at 207.
33. F. MCDONALD. Novus ORDO SECLORUM 94-95 (1985); A. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 29, at 64-66.
34. A. Cox, supra note 30, at 33; Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 30, at 208-09.
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unified response.3 5 Simultaneously, the new nation faced potentially hostile
claims from Spain in Florida and along the Mississippi River, as well as from
Britain, which was still securely ensconced in Canada. Nevertheless, the states
frequently refused to recognize or be bound by the efforts of Congress' desig-
nated representatives to protect American commerce through diplomatic
channels. 6
This lack of centralized authority crippled the national government under
the Confederation and demoralized the Continental Congress. The absence of a
quorum frequently prevented Congress from transacting business; when a quo-
rum did exist the objections of a single state delegation often blocked significant
changes .3  By 1786, the new government found itself on the brink of collapse.38
These difficulties were not the only ones facing the Confederation. 9
Problems also proliferated at the state level. Commercial warfare had broken
out among the states,40 and class warfare seemed imminent to mercantile and
propertied interests in some jurisdictions a.4  For many, the last straw was
Shays's Rebellion, during which the Massachusetts authorities temporized and
seemed barely capable of preserving order.42 In short, within five years of York-
town widespread sentiment supported reform of the Articles of Confederation to
promote a more effective government.4 3 The Constitutional Convention met
against this background.
B. The New System of the Constitution
While concern over governmental ineffectiveness and irresponsibility
prompted much of the dissatisfaction with the Confederation, pre~enting tyr-
35. A. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 29, at 60-61, 66-68.
36. A. Cox, supra note 30, at 33; A. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 29, at 70-81, 123.
37. A. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 29, at 68; Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 30, at 209.
38. F. McDONALD, supra note 33, at 177-78; G. WOOD, supra note 25, at 464; Elkins & McKitrick, supra
note 30, at 208.
39. For much of this period, these problems of the central government seemed rather less important to those
who viewed the former colonies as separate states than they did to those who viewed the states as parts of a new
nation. State governments in the early 1780s appeared to be working tolerably well. A. Cox, supra note 30, at 33;
G. WOOD, supra note 25, at 464; Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 30, at 208. That perception changed later in the
decade and helped to generate support for reform of the Articles of Confederation. See infra text accompanying
notes 40-43.
That most Americans at this time viewed themselves as citizens of sovereign states rather than of a larger
country should not be surprising. The decision of Robert E. Lee and many Southern-born army officers to fight for
their states rather than for the Union during the Civil War disappointed but did not astonish federal officials. J.
MCPHERSON. BATrLE CRY OF FREEDOM 280-81 (1988). The outcome of that war effected a fundamental transfor-
mation of public consciousness. From that time, Americans much more readily conceived of themselves as citizens
of the nation than of sovereign states. Id. at 859.
40. Concern over interstate economic conflicts led to the abortive Annapolis Convention of 1786. A. Cox,
supra note 30, at 34; Elkins & MeKitrick, supra note 30, at 209.
41. A. Cox, supra note 30, at 33; G. WOOD, supra note 25, at 465-66; Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 30,
at 208.
42. A. Cox, supra note 30, at 33; A. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 29, at 116-17.
43. G. WOOD, supra note 25, at 360-63, 465-67; Corwin, The Progress of Constitutional Theory Between
the Declaration of Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia Convention, 30 AM. HiST. REv. 511, 513
(1925).
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anny and protecting liberty remained preeminent values in the new nation."' As
the 1780s wore on, Americans increasingly viewed the idea of separation of
powers as "the most important attribute of the kinds of governments they had
fought for."45 Thus, the framers who met in Philadelphia during the summer of
1787 faced an apparent choice between efficiency and freedom as they struggled
to give content to this idea.41
The Constitutional Convention evaded this dilemma, if one may so charac-
terize the situation, by means of a novel attempt to accommodate both goals.
The delegates rejected the "pure doctrine" of separation of powers, under which
each branch is assigned a unique function and may not intrude upon the func-
tion of any other branch, 47 in favor of a more ambiguous system of checks and
balances, under which each branch was given a limited control over the exercise
of the functions of the other branches. 48
The framers established a government of separated powers assigned respec-
tively to legislative, executive, and judicial branches. 49 The legislature was di-
vided into two chambers-a House of Representatives elected by the people and
apportioned more or less according to population50 and a Senate chosen indi-
rectly under a formula guaranteeing each state equal representation.5 The ex-
ecutive branch would have one person, the indirectly elected President, at the
helm. 52 The judiciary would not be elected at all and would have tenure and
salary guarantees to insulate it from most external pressure.53
44. Opponents of the Convention's handiwork "accepted the broad outlines of the picture painted by the
friends of the Constitution." H. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 26 (1981). They differed in
the extent to which they viewed the problems under Confederation as stemming from the weakness of the central
government and in their assessment of the desirability and likely success of the new charter. Id. at 28.
45. G. WOOD, supra note 25, at 453. See M. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
153-54 (1967); G. WOOD, supra note 25, at 449-53. If the practices of early state governments can serve as a
guide, Americans in the first years after 1776 had a rudimentary concept of separation of powers principles. These
charters often were more concerned with avoiding repetition of the manipulation of the courts and legislatures by
colonial governors than with providing for meaningful division of governmental authority. M. VILE, supra, at 153-
57.
The divergence between theory and practice resulted more from the difficulties of governing under extraordi-
nary conditions than from conscious repudiation of principle, however. Id. at 132-47. Even opponents of the Con-
stitution accepted the basic premise of separation of powers; the Anti-Federalists generally did not defend the lack
of "any differentiation of functions or internal checks" under the Confederation. H. STORING, supra note 44, at
55.
46. In fact, as many as five different theoretical justifications for the concept of separation of powers existed
when the Constitutional Convention assembled. W. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 127-
28 (1965). In addition to the rationales of efficiency, see id. at 31-35; Banks, Efficiency in Government: Separation
of Powers Reconsidered, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 715, 718-22 .(1984); and liberty, see W. GWYN, supra, at 18-23,
40-43; M. VILE, supra note 45, at 61-63; others included the rule of law, see W. GwYN, supra, at 52-58, 71-76,
104-13; official accountability, see id. at 60-64, 85-87; and balancing powers within the government, see id. at 55-
56, 85-87.
47. M. VILE, supra note 45, at 13-18.
48. Id. at 18. For discussion of the English antecedents of balanced government, see id. at 53-75.
49. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § I (legislative); art. II, § 1, el. 1 (executive); art. III, § 1 (judicial).
50. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1, 3.
51. Id. § 3, cl. 1. As a practical matter, the states are guaranteed equal representation in the Senate in
perpetuity because no state may have its delegation in that chamber reduced without its consent. Id. art. V.
52. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1-3.
53. Id. art. III, § 1. The Supreme Court was the only judicial institution created by the Constitution. Con-
gress was given discretion to create inferior courts, discretion which it exercised in the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch.
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This new scheme thus directly addressed two of the major problems of the
Confederation. First, the Constitution gave the federal government explicit au-
thority to tax54 and to regulate interstate and foreign commerce.55 Second, the
new charter created a unitary executive. 5  These features suggest that consider-
ations of efficiency played an important part in the drafting process. At the
same time, the federal government was given only enumerated powers. 57 These
restrictions upon central authority suggest an effort to reduce the prospect of
tyranny. Thus, the Constitution created *a structure that seemed to address both
of the principal concerns arising from the experience under the Articles of
Confederation.
Consistent with their rejection of the pure separation theory, the drafters of
the new charter blended the responsibilities of the branches. Accordingly, the
Constitution also provided for a complex set of checks and balances to structure
interbranch relationships. A few familiar examples illustrate those interactions.
Congress received the power to legislate, but the President was given a qualified
veto over bills approved by both the House and the Senate, which could in turn
override an executive disapproval by a supermajority vote in each chamber.5
Similarly, the President was designated as Commander in Chief of the armed
forces, 59 but only Congress could declare war. 60 The President gained the power
to make treaties, but only with the advice and consent of a supermajority of the
Senate.6" The President also would appoint officers of the United States, includ-
ing judges, but the Senate once again had to give its advice and consent."2 In
addition, Congress could limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 63
Two features of the constitutional scheme are worthy of comment. First,
the rejection of the pure separation theory allowed opponents of the new charter
20, §§ 2-4, I Stat. 73, 73-75. Members of both the Supreme Court and the lower courts were to enjoy identical
tenure and salary protection. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
54. US. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1. This power was limited by the uniformity clause in the same provision that
gave the federal government the authority to levy taxes. See also id. § 9, cl. 4 (restricting direct taxation).
55. Id. § 8, cl. 3.
56. See E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFrICE AND POWERS, 1787-1957, at 3-30 (1957); Strauss, supra note
23, at 599-602.
57. This feature is most noticeable in the provisions dealing with the lawmaking function. Those provisions
begin by stating that "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States .. " US. CONsT. art. I, § I. Later, Congress is explicitly granted certain authority, see id. § 8, and
forbidden to undertake other actions, id. § 9.
58. Id. § 7, ci. 2.
59. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. I.
60. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1I.
61. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
62. Id.
63. The precise contours of the congressional powers to establish exceptions to the jurisdiction of article III
tribunals and to abolish the lower federal courts that have been created are matters of some scholarly controversy.
See, e.g., Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498
(1974); Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongo-
ing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984); Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Redish, Congressional Power to Regulate
Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Under the Exceptions Clause: An Internal and External Examination, 27
VILL L. REV. 900 (1982); Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on
Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981). Resolution
of these controversies is beyond the scope of this Article.
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to argue that the excessive blending of the branches threatened liberty by grant-
ing inordinate power to the federal government. 4 More modern commentators
who are less troubled about the activist state claim that the Constitution created
less a system of "separated powers" than "a government of separated institu-
tions sharing powers."",
This observation, whether made in the eighteenth century or the twentieth,
mistakenly assumes that power is an undifferentiated concept that can be allo-
cated more or less randomly to any governmental institution. A more accurate
assessment of the constitutional allocation of powers recognizes that govern-
ments perform different functions and that those functions are appropriately
performed by institutions having different characteristics. Each branch, under
this view, has superior but not exclusive authority with regard to its functions."6
For example, the making of policy that reflects popular will is most appropri-
ately undertaken by the legislature, a comparatively large institution that repre-
sents a broad array of interests, holds public sessions, and follows procedures
that foster deliberation. Yet because no legislator, however chosen, has a na-
tional constituency, the qualified presidential veto can block improper, unwise,
or unduly parochial proposals. 67
Second, the blending of po.xvers in the Constitution greatly enhanced the
possibilities of interbranch conflict, especially between Congress and the Presi-
dent. This feature was not accidental. The framers recognized and accepted
human frailty, most notably in Madison's famous comment that "[i]f men were
angels, no government would be necessary." '68 They therefore established a sys-
tem designed to prevent overreaching by one branch at the expense of another
64. See H. STORING, supra note 44, at 15-21, 28. Madison responded directly to this criticism by arguing
that separation of powers, properly understood, "did not mean that these departments ought to have no partial
agency in, or no control over the acts of each other." THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 302 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter
ed. 1961). Rather, he contended, tyranny impended only "where the whole power of one department is exercised
by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department." Id. at 302-03.
A related objection to the Constitution focused upon the absence of a bill of rights. See THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION: FOR AND AGAINST 17-18, 40-43 (J. Pole ed. 1987). Hamilton rebutted this criticism in three ways.
He began by showing that the charter explicitly protected some individual rights. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 511
(A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); see The Individual Liberties Within the Body of the Constitution: A
Symposium, 37 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 589-861 (1987). Next, he maintained that a bill of rights would be "unnec-
essary" and perhaps "dangerous" because it would, serve as a pretext for the government to claim more powers
than had been granted. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, supra, at 513. Finally, he contended that "the Constitution is
itself, in every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, a bill of rights." Id. at 515 (emphasis omitted); see
Rossum, The Federalist's Understanding of the Constitution as a Bill of Rights, in SAVING THE REVOLUTION
219, 221-28 (C. Kesler ed. 1987).
65. R. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER 26 (rev. ed. 1980) (emphasis and footnote omitted). The first edi-
tion of this classic work in political science appeared in 1960, when the dominant approaches in that discipline
discounted the significance of legal and constitutional factors in politics. Some scholars viewed these factors as
irrelevant, while others rejected them as undesirable obstacles to effective national leadership. See generally Bes-
sette & Tulis, The Constitution, Politics, and the Presidency, in THE PRESIDENCY IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL OR-
DER 3, 4-6 (J. Bessette & J. Tulis eds. 1981).
66. See H. STORING, supra note 44, at 60; J. TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 41 (1987).
67. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 947-48 (1983); R. SPITZER, THE
PRESIDENTIAL VETO 16, 17 (1988); J. TULIS, supra note 66, at 42-43.
68. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). One of Madison's coauthors
added that government was instituted "[b]eeause the passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason
and justice without constraint." THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 110 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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and of liberty.69 Instead of relying upon rigid functional boundaries,"0 the Con-
stitution sought to provide officials of each branch with "the necessary constitu-
tional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. 17' To
prevent overreaching, therefore, "[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambi-
tion." 2 These ground rules would structure interbranch conflict, and would do
so in ways that increased the likelihood of beneficial outcomes.7
The President's qualified veto power, which already has been mentioned,
illustrates this concept. Wary of pre-Revolution abuses of the royal prerogative
by the British crown, Americans hesitated to allow the President any power to
disapprove legislation .7  Nevertheless, many supported some such right as a
means of protecting the executive from legislative encroachment. 5 Because the
President might refrain from exercising an absolute veto for fear of being la-
beled a despot,78 the framers provided for a qualified presidential negative that
would give Congress an opportunity to reconsider and give effect to a vetoed
proposal if it attracted an unusually large measure of support. This seemingly
less extreme authority, they reasoned, was simultaneously more likely to be used
and less likely to offend, and therefore would serve as a potent weapon in the
new government.77
Strikingly absent from these discussions of the benefits of interbranch polit-
ical conflict as a mechanism for promoting effective, nontyrannical government
is any mention of the judiciary as umpire of constitutional disputes between
Congress and the President .7  We shall consider whether this omission has sig-
nificance in Part III. For now, suffice it to'say that these matters have not been
exceptions to de Tocqueville's observation quoted in the first paragraph of this
69. D. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 137-38 (1984); M. WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, THE
FEDERALIST, AND THE CONSTITUTION 97-98 (1987).
70. The framers rejected the definitional approach because they viewed it as unworkable. As Madison
explained:
Experience has instructed us that no skill in the science of government has yet been able to discriminate
and define, with sufficient certainty, its three great provinces-the legislative, executive, and judiciary; or
even the privileges and powers of the different legislative branches. Questions daily occur in the course of
practice which prove the obscurity which reigns in these subjects, and which puzzle the greatest adepts in
political science.
THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 228 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). See also D. EPSTEIN, supra note 69, at 127;
M. WHITE, supra note 69, at 103.
71. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 68, at 321-22.
72. Id. at 322. It bears emphasis that "ambition" in this context does not imply that officials necessarily act
with corrupt purposes when they seek excessive powers. M. WHITE, supra note 69, at 98.
73. H. STORING, supra note 44, at 61; J. TuLls, supra note 66, at 43-45.
74. L. FISHER. CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETwEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 141 (1985); R.
SPITZER, supra note 67, at 8-12, 21-22.
75. Without some veto power, absolute or qualified, the President "might gradually be stripped of his au-
thorities by successive resolutions or annihilated by a single vote. And in the one mode or the other, the legislative
and executive powers might speedily come to be blended in the same hands." THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 442 (A.
Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Even some opponents of the Constitution accepted this reasoning. R. SPITZER,
supra note 67, at 21; H. STORING, supra note 44, at 61.
76. It also was recognized that an absolute veto might be used too readily in extraordinary circumstances,
thereby increasing the risk of executive aggrandizement or presidential tyranny. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51,
supra note 68, at 323; R. SPITZER, supra note 67, at 12.
77. THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 444-46 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); R. SPITZER, supra note 67, at
17-20.
78. D. EPSTEIN, supra note 69, at 140.
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Article. The following discussion examines the recent work of the Supreme
Court in this field.
II. SEPARATION OF POWERS JURISPRUDENCE IN THE 1980s
The past decade has witnessed numerous constitutional challenges to insti-
tutions exercising federal authority. These challenges have afforded the Su-
preme Court the opportunity to clarify the appropriate division of functions
among the branches. The results of this enterprise have produced some illumi-
nation and considerable confusion. Sometimes the Court has applied a formal
approach emphasizing the separateness of the branches, while other times it has
taken a more pragmatic perspective focusing upon their interdependence. Al-
though the choice of methodology has determined the outcome of every case,
the opinions consistently have failed to articulate how or why the Court has
selected its analytical approach.
This Part focuses upon cases involving the respective powers of Congress
and the President.7 It begins with a brief look at three rulings spawned by
aspects of the Nixon presidency that have come to be subsumed under the label
of Watergate, then proceeds chronologically through the 1980s to consider the
legislative veto, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, the Ethics in Government
Act, and two cases from the 1988 Term presenting issues under the delegation
doctrine. The discussion emphasizes both the contrasting analytical approaches
used in these cases and the empirical and logical difficulties inherent in these
approaches.
A. The Watergate-Related Cases
The June 17, 1972, burglary of the Democratic National Committee's
headquarters in the Watergate office complex set in motion a series of investiga-
tions of White House involvement in unlawful and unethical activities. Eventu-
ally a special prosecutor was appointed to direct the criminal investigation. The
special prosecutor obtained a subpoena directing President Nixon to produce
various tape recordings, papers, and other materials relating to a pending crimi-
79. These decisions represent only the tip of the iceberg. Numerous lower court cases during this period also
have challenged the constitutionality of federal activities. E.g., SEC v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 855 F.2d 677,
681-82 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1172 (1989); Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 814 F.2d 731 (D.C.
Cir. 1987); Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 787 F.2d 875, 881-87 (3d Cir.), on reh'g, 809
F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed, 109 S. Ct. 297 (1988); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Pierce,
697 F.2d 303, 305-06 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Friedlander v. United States Postal Serv., 658 F. Supp. 95,
99-102 (D.D.C. 1987). A rough statistical survey recently found a marked increase in the number of federal cases
since 1960 in which the court discussed the concept of separation of powers, an increase that persisted even with
modest controls for growth in the size and output of the judiciary. Miller, From Compromise to Confrontation:
Separation of Powers in the Reagan Era, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 401, 402-04 (1989). See also supra notes 2 &
24 (discussing recent Supreme Court rulings on other aspects of governmental structure).
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nal trial.80 A unanimous Court upheld the validity of the subpoena against a
claim of executive privilege in United States v. Nixon.8 '
In reaching its conclusion, the Court rejected a rigid view of separation of
powers. Without disputing the President's contention that the executive branch
has exclusive authority over prosecution,"2 the opinion emphasized the need for
effective governance.8 3 Thus, there was no "absolute, unqualified Presidential
privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances." 4 Rather,
the constitutional inquiry should focus upon the extent to which enforcing the
subpoena for specific presidential materials that were "demonstrably. relevant"
to a particular criminal trial85 would interfere with the performance of essential
executive functions such as protecting the national security. Because President
Nixon had failed to show such interference in this case, his claim of privilege
failed. 8
Within two weeks, the White House released transcripts of some of the
tape recordings sought by the special prosecutor. Those tapes confirmed that
soon after the Watergate break-in, the President had had detailed discussions
with his aides about concealing the administration's involvement. Three days
later, Nixon resigned. 7 His departure set off a dispute over the ownership and
control of his official papers, a dispute that returned to the Supreme Court three
80. Leon Jaworski, the special prosecutor who sought those materials, was in fact the second person to hold
that position. The first, Archibald Cox, had been discharged and his office abolished several months earlier over
his efforts to obtain nine specific recordings of presidential conversations. Attorney General Richardson resigned
and Deputy Attorney General Ruckelshaus was fired after refusing orders to dismiss Cox. The intense public
reaction to these events led to the reestablishment of the special prosecutor's office and the appointment of Jawor-
ski. For a contemporaneous account of these events, see E. DREW. WASHINGTON JOURNAL 4-5, 17, 21, 46-67, 75,
76-77, 85, 91 (1975).
81. 418 U.S. 683 (1974) [hereinafter Nixon 1]. The ease arose from the President's unsuccessful motion to
have the district court quash the subpoena. The Supreme Court heard the case under a rare procedure that
bypassed proceedings in the court of appeals. Id. at 689-90. See generally Lindgren & Marshall, The Supreme
Court's Extraordinary Power to Grant Certiorari Before Judgment in the Court of Appeals, 1986 Sup. CT. REV.
259.
82. Nixon 1, 418 U.S. at 693. This would be the central issue in the litigation over the independent counsel
provisions of the Ethics in Government Act. See infra Part lI.D.
83. The opinion observed that
the Framers of the Constitution sought to provide a comprehensive system, but the separate powers were
not intended to operate with absolute independence.. . . To read the Art. II powers of the President as
providing an absolute privilege as against a subpoena essential to enforcement of criminal statutes on no
more than a generalized claim of the public interest in confidentiality of nonmilitary and nondiplomatic
discussions would upset the constitutional balance of "a workable government" .
Nixon 1, 418 U.S. at 707.
84. Id. at 706.
85. Id. at 712.
86. Id. at 707-13.
Before addressing the merits, the Court rejected the argument that the controversy was a nonjusticiable
intrabranch dispute. The regulations establishing the special prosecutor's office assured the special prosecutor of
substantial independence in the performance of his duties. Because they also had the force of law so long as they
remained in force, the case did not present a simple squabble between superior and subordinate. Id. at 694-97.
The Court did not allude to any constitutional infirmity in the provision that the special prosecutor could be
removed only for "extraordinary improprieties" and then only with the consensus approval of the party leaders
and top-ranking members of the relevant committees in both houses of Congress. See id. at 694-95 n.8. But cf.
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986) (holding that Congress may not participate in the removal of officials
exercising executive power, except if the removal occurs through the process of impeachment expressly provided in
the Constitution); see infra Part II.C.
87. See E. DREW, supra note 80, at 389-416.
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years afterward in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services.8 8 This decision
upheld the constitutionality of the provisions of the Presidential Recordings and
Materials Preservation Act89 directing the head of the General Services Admin-
istration to take control of Mr. Nixon's official papers and records and to pre-
serve them from destruction."
In rejecting Mr. Nixon's claim that the Act was facially invalid because it
impermissibly encroached upon the chief executive's authority, thie Court again
abjured a rigid view of separation of powers in favor of a perspective emphasiz-
ing checks and balances. Relying upon the ruling in the Watergate tapes case,
the majority reasoned that "the proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which
[the Act] prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally
assigned functions." 9' In the event that a statute did interfere with the perform-
ance of executive functions, the measure still might pass muster if "that impact
[were] justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitu-
tional authority of Congress."'92 Finding no undue disruption of the executive
(based in part upon the assignment of control over the presidential materials to
an executive branch agency), the Court held the Act constitutional on its face. 3
The Court's adoption of a "pragmatic, flexible approach" 94 in these cases
left undefined the precise nature of the unjustified disruption of executive func-
tions that would violate the Constitution.95 Perhaps the unique historical cir-
cumstances of the demise of the Nixon presidency made this problem less ur-
gent at the time.96 As we shall see, however, the 1980s demonstrated the
difficulty of giving content-in particular, judicially manageable content-to
the checks-and-balances perspective.
Meanwhile, the Court was addressing the principal statutory reform that
came out of the problems uncovered by the various Watergate investigations.
Among other changes, the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of
197497 created a six-member Federal Election Commission to administer and
88. 433 U.S. 425 (1977) [hereinafter Nixon 11].
89. Pub. L. No. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1695 (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 2107 note (1982)).
90. The Act also directed the Administrator to promulgate appropriate regulations for public access to these
materials, a task that had not been completed when the litigation took place. Nixon II, 433 U.S. at 430. This
statute was passed to supersede an agreement with the Administrator that recognized the former President's sole
ownership of these materials, gave him effective control over access to them, required the destruction of tape
recordings of White House conversations within ten years, and allowed him to remove "any or all" of the other
materials three years after the agreement was made. Id. at 431-32.
91. Id. at 443.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 443-45. Two Justices, in separate opinions, also placed some weight upon President Ford's having
signed the Act into law and President Carter's submission through the Solicitor General that the Act benefited
rather than harmed the executive branch in the performance of its duties. Id. at 491 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 498, 501-02 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
94. Nixon 11, 433 U.S. at 442.
95. See id. at 511-12 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 548 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
96. See Nixon 11, 433 U.S. at 472 (upholding legislation specifically addressing Mr. Nixon's official records
because he constituted "a legitimate class of one"); id. at 486 (Stevens, J., concurring) (observing that Mr. Nixon
"resigned his office under unique circumstances"); id. at 493-94 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (emphasizing the "extraordinary events that led to [Mr. Nixon's] resignation and pardon").
97. Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified as further amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 18, 26 &
47 U.S.C. (1982)).
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enforce the'new political ground rules. Two commissioners were to be appointed
by the President and two each by the President pro tempore of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House; all six were to be confirmed by majority vote of both
congressional chambers.9
The Court in Buckley v. Valeo99 held that the procedure for selecting
members of the FEC violated the appointments clause, which requires that "of-
ficers of the United States" be nominated by the President and confirmed by
the Senate but also permits "inferior officers" to be chosen unilaterally by the
President, the courts, or the heads of governmental departments. 00 The Court
reasoned that the powers of the Commission involved its members in "exercising
significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States."'' This in turn
made the commissioners "officers of the United States" who must be chosen in
conformity with the appointments clause. 2 Further, the omission of Congress
from the list of those allowed to appoint inferior officers disqualified the leader-
ship of the legislative branch from selecting members of the Commission. 0 3
Of particular importance, the Court explicitly rejected a rigid demarcation
of the three branches. Its substantive discussion not only emphasized that "the
Constitution by no means contemplates total separation of each of [the] three
essential branches of Government,"'0 4 but also recognized both the value of dis-
persing power to safeguard liberty and the need for sufficient interaction of the
branches to promote effective government. 05 Finally, although the opinion em-
98. The Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House also served as nonvoting members of the
Commission. Id. § 310(a)(1).
99. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
100. US. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2:
[The President] . . . shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall
appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall
be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as
they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
101. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126.
102. Id. at 138-41.
103. Id. at 126-27. A more parsimonious basis for this result would have emphasized that nothing in the
appointments clause authorizes the House to vote to approve the selection of either officers of the United States or
inferior officers. Because all parties agreed that members of the FEC fell into one or the other of these categories,
see id. at 126 & n.162, the Court technically did not have to determine whether the Commissioners were "of-
ficers" or "inferior officers."
The opinion also failed adequately to address the claim that the disputed role of Congress in selecting mem-
bers of the Commission was justified by concerns that a body appointed solely by the President might be subject to
White House manipulation during the chief executive's reelection campaign. The Court recognized the legitimacy
of those fears but dismissed them as "not by themselves warrant[ing] a distortion of the Framers' work." Id. at
134. This response was incomplete at best. A fuller answer would have emphasized the purposes underlying "the
Framers' work." The appointments clause itself addressed the point at issue by giving the Senate the power,
indeed the duty, to scrutinize nominees proffered by the President and to refuse to confirm any who lack the
character to resist manipulation of their agency. This senatorial prerogative represents one of those necessary
constitutional means and personal motives by which the framers expected ambition to counteract ambition. See
supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
104. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 121.
105. The Court explained:
The men who met in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 were practical statesmen, experienced in polities,
who viewed the principle of separation of powers as a vital check against tyranny. But they likewise saw
that a hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government from one another would preclude the
establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively.
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phasized that Congress (and, by necessary implication, congressional appoin-
tees) may not control the enforcement of the law, it did not assert that this was
a purely executive function over which the President must have unfettered
control. 0 8
In short, these cases reflected a largely pragmatic approach to conflicts be-
tween Congress and the President over the allocation of governmental powers.
When it found specific constitutional text bearing upon the matter, the Court
attempted to give effect to that language. When it did not, the Court sought to
strike a reasonable balance of competing interests. In none of these cases did
the Court seek permanently to resolve all aspects of the interbranch conflict
before it. At times during the 1980s, the Justices have been more. ambitious.
The next sections consider these more recent cases.
B. The Legislative Veto
Beginning with the Reorganization Act of 1932,107 Congress included pro-
visions in numerous statutes allowing either or both houses, or in some instances
a committee, to disapprove executive or administrative actions. 08 Although the
so-called legislative veto originated as a political accommodation to facilitate
structural reform in the executive branch, the device eventually spread into nu-
merous substantive areas of both domestic and foreign policy. 09 Presidents con-
sistently opposed these provisions as intrusions upon executive power but often
accepted them as the price for obtaining broad delegations to undertake initia-
tives for which legal authority was otherwise lacking. 110
Id.
106. For example, at the outset of its substantive discussion, the Court emphasized the "three essential
branches of Government." Id. Later, however, it characterized the departments whose heads may be granted the
power to appoint inferior officers as "[being] in the Executive Branch or at least hav[ingl some connection with
that branch." Id. at 127 (emphasis added). The italicized phrase implicitly recognized the existence of so-called
independent agencies which are not "in" any of the three branches.
In addition, the opinion suggested that the Commission's rulemaking functions cannot be exercised by a
congressionally controlled agency. Id. at 140. This is curious because rulemaking traditionally has been viewed as
"the result of a delegation of legislative power." Strauss, supra note 23, at 618. For present purposes, this point
simply underscores the Buckley Court's unwillingness to follow a rigid approach to separation of powers questions.
The implied hostility to congressional control over administrative rulemaking ultimately was manifested in deci-
sions invalidating the legislative veto. See infra Part II.B. In this case, however, the Court avoided resolution of
the constitutionality of a one-house veto of FEC regulations. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 140 n.176.
107. Ch. 314, § 407, 47 Stat. 382, 414-15.
108. Scholars differ on the precise number of these provisions, although the figure is substantial. One writer
reports that 318 legislative veto provisions were included in 210 statutes between 1932 and 1982. G. BRYNER.
BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION 76 (1987). Two others cite studies showing that 295 such provisions appeared in 196
statutes between 1932 and 1975 and that 78 more were adopted between 1979 and 1982. W. ESKRIDGE, JR. & P.
FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 496 (1988) (citing C. NORTON, CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW,
DEFERRAL AND DISRUPTION OF EXECUTIVE ACTIONS: A SUMMARY AND INVENTORY OF STATUTORY AUTHORITY
8-12 (1976), and Cooper, The Legislative Veto in the 1980s, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 364, 367 (L. Dodd &
B. Oppenheimer 3d ed. 1985)). Resolving the statistical discrepancy would not affect the analysis of this Article.
109. See generally CONGRESSIONAL RES. SERV. FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON RULES OF THE HOUSE OF THE HOUSE
COMM. ON RULES, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., STUDIES ON THE LEGISLATIVE VETO (Comm. Print 1980).
110. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 968-74 (1983) (White, J., dissent-
ing); L. FISHER, supra note 74, at 164-70; Fisher, Congress and the President in the Administrative Process: The
Uneasy Alliance, in THE ILLUSION OF PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT 21, 26-28 (H. Heclo & L. Salamon eds. 1981);
Karl, Executive Reorganization and Presidential Power, 1977 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 3-7; Nathanson, Separation of
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The constitutional controversy came to a head in the somewhat anomalous
setting of Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha.1 1 The setting
was anomalous because that case did not involve the rulemaking or reorganiza-
tion powers over which the primary debates on the legislative veto had raged.
Instead, it concerned the deportation of Jagdish Chadha, an East Asian born in
Kenya who had overstayed his student visa."1 2 The Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service determined that Chadha qualified for suspension of deportation
because he would suffer "extreme hardship" if he were required to leave this
country.11 3 Pursuant to the one-house veto provision of the Immigration and
Nationality Act,"1 4 the House of Representatives passed a resolution disapprov-
ing the suspension of Chadha's deportation. The resolution was neither printed
nor available to Representatives; it passed by voice vote without debate at virtu-
ally the last possible moment.11 5
The Supreme Court, in striking contrast with its approach in the Water-
gate-related cases, wrote a sweeping opinion invalidating not only the statutory
provision under which the House had disapproved the INS's decision favoring
Chadha, but also striking down every legislative veto of whatever kind. Under-
lying its ruling were an explicit rejection of the importance of governmental
efficiency and an assumption that each branch has uniquely defined
responsibilities.
The Court began its substantive analysis by stating that "the fact that a
given . . . procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful . . . will not save it if it
is contrary to the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not the primary
objectives . . . of democratic government . . . ."I" Indeed, the preservation of
democratic government required constant vigilance to resist "[t]he hydraulic
pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer lim-
its of its power, even to accomplish desirable objectives."11 7 To that end, each
branch ought to be seen as "presumptively exercising the power the Constitu-
tion has delegated to it""1 8 and must act in strict compliance with the constitu-
tional requirements applicable to that branch. Because the action in question in
Powers and Administrative Law: Delegation, the Legislative Veto, and the "Independent" Agencies, 75 Nw. U.L.
REv. 1064, 1088-89 & n.74 (1981).
11I. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
112. Ironically, Chadha had come to the United States to study as a result of conversations two decades
earlier with several Peace Corps volunteers. One of those volunteers was Michael Davidson, who as legal counsel
to the Senate would argue the ease against Chadha. B. CRAIG, CHADHA 4-5 (1988).
113. Chadha's difficulties arose from ethnic tensions between blacks and Asians in his native Kenya. Al-
though he held a British passport, the United Kingdom earlier had restricted nonwhite immigration severely. Id.
at 5-7.
114. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982).
115. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 926-27. The Act required the INS, whenever it suspended a deportation,
promptly to file a report summarizing the facts of the case and the reason for the suspension. Either house of
Congress could pass a resolution disapproving that action during the same or the immediately following legislative
session. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(I)-(2) (1982). The INS filed the required report on Chadha's case in August 1974. B.
CRAIG, supra note 112, at 21. The House failed to act on it until three days before the end of its 1975 session, the
end of the period within which the suspension order could have been disapproved. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 964 n.6
(Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
116. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944.
117. Id. at 951.
118. Id.
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Chadha was taken by Congress, it was legislative in nature and therefore had to
follow the "[e]xplicit and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution" gov-
erning legislation: passage by both houses with presentation to the President for
approval or veto." 9
This reasoning is troublesome for several reasons. First, it conflates the na-
ture of the action with the identity of the actor. Under this approach, all con-
gressional actions that "ha[ve] the purpose and effect of altering the legal
rights, duties, and relations of persons .. .outside the Legislative Branch"'' 0
are legislative and must be taken in strict conformity with the bicameralism and
presentation requirements. This implies, however, that the longstanding practice
of rulemaking by administrative agencies, which also has the purpose and effect
of altering the legal rights of persons outside the legislature, is unconstitutional
for failure to satisfy those requirements.' 2'
Further, the Court simply asserted that, before the House passed its resolu-
tion, Chadha had a legal right to remain in this country. 22 In fact, the statute
could plausibly have been read as giving him that right only if: (1) the INS
suspended his deportation order and (2) neither congressional chamber passed a
resolution of disapproval within the specified limitations period. 23 The opinion
failed to explain why Chadha's legal rights were not defined by the provisions of
the Act that created them. 124
The Court might have suggested that this interpretation came distressingly
close to the "bitter with the sweet" theory that had aroused so much contro-
versy in the procedural due process field,' 25 but that theory would not be for-
mally interred until two years later.' 26 Nevertheless, that insight might have led
119. Id. at 945; see id. at 946-51.
120. Id. at 952.
121. See Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme Court's Legislative
Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE LJ. 789, 795. The Court attempted to remove the cloud that its reasoning seemed to
cast over the legitimacy of much commonplace activity in the administrative state by proclaiming agency
rulemaking to be "'quasi-legislative' in character." Chadha, 462 U.S. at 953 n.16 (quoting Humphrey's Ex'r v.
United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935)); cf. FrC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487-88 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) ("The mere retreat to the qualifying 'quasi' is implicit with confession that all recognized classifica-
tions have broken down, and 'quasi' is a smooth cover which we draw over our confusion as we might use a
counterpane to cover a disordered bed.").
122. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952.
123. Justice White made precisely this point in dissent. Id. at 993-94 (White, J., dissenting). See also Elliott,
INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution, and the Legislative Veto, 1983 Sup. CT. REv.
125, 134-37; Strauss, supra note 121, at 796.
124. Yet another difficulty with the Court's analysis arises from its presumption that any congressional ac-
tion altering the legal rights of persons outside the legislative branch must comply with the bicameralism and
presentation requirements. In exercising its oversight and investigatory responsibilities, Congress may compel the
appearance of nonlegislators before its committees and attach legal consequences for their failure to do so. For
example, the controversy that culminated in Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988), began with a dispute over
the allegedly improper withholding of executive-branch records from a congressional committee. Id. at 2605-06;
see infra Part II.D. Yet the Court did not suggest that routine committee oversight and investigations require
bicameral approval and presentation to the President. Elliott, supra note 123, at 133-34; Strauss, supra note 121,
at 795-96. For an explanation of this exception to these requirements, see Krent, Separating the Strands in Sepa-
ration of Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L. Rav. 1253, 1276 & n.99 (1988).
125. This theory posited that the government could, without violating constitutional guarantees of due pro-
cess, confer a substantive liberty or property interest in a statute that provided limited or informal procedures for
vindicating that interest. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 152-54 (1974) (plurality opinion).
126. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).
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the Court to focus less upon the identity of the actor than upon the character of
the action in question. This was, in fact, the approach taken by Justice Powell
in a concurring opinion. He emphasized that, instead of prescribing a general
rule of future effect applicable to a more or less general class, Congress had
determined for itself that a specific individual failed to satisfy particular statu-
tory standards . 2 7 Such a decision involved the performance of a typically judi-
cial function and was made in this instance with none of the procedural protec-
tions and other checks against arbitrary action that inhere in adjudication. The
absence of those protections rendered this specific legislative veto provision un-
constitutional but would not necessarily invalidate others." 8
This approach has the virtue of recognizing the different contexts in which
legislative vetoes can arise. Nevertheless, it is not entirely free from difficulty.
One cannot confidently assert that Congress lacks constitutional authority to
pass on decisions to suspend deportation because, before the procedure at issue
in Chadha was adopted, the legislature itself resolved such cases through pri-
vate bills. 1 9 Moreover, the Constitution gives Congress express authority over
immigration, 30 and one of Madison's statements in the Constitutional Conven-
tion strongly implies his belief that the legislature had power over individual
naturalization cases."' Thus, focusing more narrowly upon the nature of the
action at issue in Chadha would not necessarily have required invalidating the
legislative veto provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act.,"'
The difficulties of a contextual perspective do not end here. As remarked
earlier, the pre-Chadha debate had focused primarily upon the use of the legis-
lative veto in connection with rulemaking and reorganization. Some commenta-
tors have suggested contrasting analyses of the veto in these varying settings.
They believe that legislative vetoes can be justified in reorganization and similar
statutes because government reorganization, salary adjustment, and impound-
ment decisions-some typical examples of so-called nonregulatory vetoes-are
essentially matters of Washington housekeeping appropriate for rough and
ready political accommodation between the White House and Capitol Hill.' 33
Legislative vetoes of administrative rules-so-called regulatory vetoes-are said
to divert congressional attention from fundamental policy concerns toward the
127. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 964-65 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
128. Id. at 960, 965-67.
129. The opinion of the Court emphasized this historical fact in explaining why the suspension decision was
legislative in nature and therefore subject to the bicameralism and presentation requirements. Chadha, 462 U.S.
at 954.
130. The legislative branch is given power "[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
131. Madison objected to a proposal to require that members of the Senate have been citizens for 14 years
"because it will put it out of the power of the Nat[iona]l Legislature even by special acts of naturalization to
confer the full rank of Citizens on meritorious strangers." 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 236 (M. Farrand rev. ed. 1937).
132. Supporters of the legislative veto nevertheless concede that the use of the veto in deportation cases raises
important constitutional questions. See Dry, The Congressional Veto and the Separation of Powers, in THE PRESI-
DENCY IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER, supra note 65, at 195, 222-23.
133. E.g., Dixon, The Congressional Veto and Separation of Powers: The Executive on a Leash?, 56 N.C.L.
REV. 423, 470-71 (1978); Strauss, supra note 121, at 805-06; Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law and.
the Idea of Independence, 30 Wt. & MARY L. REV. 301, 314 (1989).
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minutiae of administration, give inordinate weight to sophisticated or well-con-
nected interest groups, enhance the role of committee staffs, destabilize the poli-
cymaking process by increasing the likelihood of stalemate arising from conflicts
between agencies and Congress unmediated by presidential participation, and
complicate judicial review of regulations that are not vetoed by the
legislature.134
The distinction between regulatory and nonregulatory vetoes may have less
significance than its advocates suppose, however. First, it is by no means obvious
that the reorganization, budgetary, and salary questions subsumed under the
"nonregulatory" label are purely housekeeping matters, as the public outcry
over the proposed 1989 federal pay raise attests. 135 More importantly, a regula-
tory veto typically prevents the government from taking action against private
parties.1 36 To the extent that the legislative veto of an agency rule prevents the
government from harming private interests, the device might be said incre-
mentally to promote liberty, one of the core values in our constitutional
scheme.' 37
Opponents of the legislative veto might respond that this particular mecha-
nism, by advantaging well-organized or powerful private interests, aggravates
the problem of faction, the avoidance of which was another cardinal principle
for the framers of the Constitution. 3 8 Perhaps this concern, coupled with the
difficulty of meaningfully distinguishing among the varieties of legislative ve-
toes, prompted the Court to paint with so broad a brush in Chadha. Whatever
the explanation, within days of that ruling the Justices summarily affirmed two
lower court rulings invalidating one- and two-house regulatory vetoes. 3 1
One difficulty with this admittedly potent response is that it proves too
much. Even without the legislative veto, Congress retains numerous alternative
devices to prevent administrative overreaching. 40 The details of regulation typi-
134. See, e.g., Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEx. L. REV. 207, 221-22 (1984);
Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 1369, 1381-82, 1409-20 (1977); Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of Congres-
sional Power, 68 VA. L. REV. 253, 267-85 (1982).
135. See L. FISHER, supra note 74, at 167; Hook, How the Pay-Raise Strategy Came Unraveled, 47 CONG.
Q. WEEKLY REP. 264 (1989); Nathanson, supra note 110, at 1090.
136. It was in this sense that the factual setting in Chadha was anomalous. The legislative veto exercised by
the House of Representatives in that case burdened Jagdish Chadha by requiring him to leave the United States
for an uncertain fate.
137. See Nathanson, supra note 110, at 1089-90.
138. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 435-36. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77-84 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed.
1961).
139. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983), affig Consumer
Energy Council v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (1-house veto); United States Senate v. FTC, 463 U.S.
1216 (1983), affg Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en banc) (per curiam)
(2-house veto).
140. Among these are limiting agency jurisdiction, see, e.g., Levitas & Brand, Congressional Review of Ex-
ecutive and Agency Actions After Chada [sic]: "The Son of Legislative Veto" Lives On, 72 GEo. LJ. 801, 803
(1984); placing restrictive riders on appropriations measures, see, e.g., Devins,.Regulation of Government Agen-
cies Through Limitation Riders, 1987 DUKE L.J. 456; Fisher, supra note I10, at 28-29; enacting "report and
wait" provisions that delay the effective date of regulations until Congress has had an opportunity to pass legisla-
tion preventing them from taking effect, see, e.g., L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 77 (1985); and adopting
procedural devices that closely approximate but do not exactly replicate the legislative veto, see, e.g., Breyer, The
Legislative Veto After Chadha, 72 GEo. L.J. 785, 792-95 (1984). See generally R. PIERCE, JR. S. SHAPIRO & P.
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cally concern low-visibility matters of intense concern to a few but of much less
concern to the public at large. These are precisely the kinds of issues as to
which sophisticated, well-organized private interests are likely to enjoy dispro-
portionate advantages throughout the political process.14 Perhaps the legislative
veto poses unique risks of aggravating the problem of faction. No reliable evi-
dence supports this proposition, however. The principal empirical study of the
operation and effect of the veto failed to examine programs in which regulations
were not subject to legislative vetoes.1 42 At most, then, we can conclude that
powerful special interests might find it marginally more difficult to prevail
under different procedural devices, but many of the harmful effects of the legis-
lative veto have been documented in congressional oversight of administrative
regulation that is not subject to such a veto.' 43
In other words, the debate over the legislative veto concerns "matters of
degree" rather than of kind. 44 Separation of powers problems may involve "ef-
fects at the margin,"' 45 but in a field in which distinctions are often evanescent
one might pause before attributing constitutional significance to small differ-
ences. The legislative veto may well promote inefficient policies and reward stra-
tegic behavior by rent-seeking private interests, a point to which we shall return
in Part 111.14 Nevertheless, if "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does not enact
Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics,"'147 it seems unlikely that article I incor-
porates Arrow's Impossibility Theorem"48 or any other tenet of public choice
theory.
VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 75-78 (1985); Kaiser, Congressional Control of Executive Actions
in the Aftermath of the Chadha Decision, 36 ADMIN. L. REV. 239, 243-70 (1984).
141. See M. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS 99-101, 103-04 (1981); K. SCHLOZMAN & J. TIERNEY.
ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 314-17, 395-98 (1986); Evans, PAC Contributions and Roll-
Call Voting: Conditional Power, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 114, 116-22 (A. Cigler & B. Loomis 2d ed. 1986);
Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 885-87 (1987); see also Sunstein,
Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 48-49, 52-53, 59-64 (1985).
142. Professor Bruff and Dean Gellhorn examined only the five programs that had provided "[m]ost of the
current federal experience with legislative veto of rulemaking." Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 134, at 1371. The
omission of any program in which substantive rules were not subject to legislative veto prevents reliable inferences
about the distinctive impact of the veto upon the programs that were studied. See, e.g., D. CAMPBELL & J. STAN-
LEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH 6-7 (1963).
143. Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 134, at 1382 n.45, 1386-87, 1389, 1422-23; Robinson, The Federal Com-
munications Commission: An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. REV. 169, 201-02 (1978).
144. Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 134, at 1420.
145. Martin, supra note 134, at 294.
146. Much recent legal commentary on the legislative process draws upon the economic theory of legislation,
which posits that legislators act only out of self-interest. For a critical summary, see Farber & Frickey, supra note
141, at 890-901. Although many commentators have rested their criticisms of the legislative veto on noneconomic
grounds, Professor Bruff explicitly invoked public choice theory as an important part of his analysis. Bruff, supra
note 134, at 214-18. Dean Gellhorn, his sometime coauthor, see G. ROBINSON. E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (3d ed. 1986); Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 134, has relied upon that theory in his
writing on other separation of powers issues. See, e.g., Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, A Theory of Legislative
Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1982).
147. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
148. See generally K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963).
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C. The Deficit, the Comptroller General, and the Removal Power
The next conflict between Congress and the President to reach the Su-
preme Court concerned the validity of the central feature of the Gramm-Rud-
man-Hollings Act. 49 That statute, passed in response to widespread concern
over persistent and unprecedentedly large federal deficits, 50 called for a phased
elimination of the annual budget shortfall over a six-year period. It did so by
imposing automatic, across-the-board spending cuts if the projected deficit at
the beginning of the fiscal year exceeded the statutory maximum for that year.
The cuts, under a process called sequestration, would become effective unless
legislation embodying some alternative way to reduce the deficit to the statutory
limit were adopted. 5' In essence, the threat of sequestration was intended to
loom large enough to force the political branches to reduce the deficit but small
enough to discourage them from repealing or otherwise avoiding the law's
requirements. 52
The ensuing litigation ultimately centered upon the role of the Comptroller
General in implementing Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. Under this legislation, the
Comptroller had the authority both to calculate the projected deficit in case the
independent figures of the Office of Management and Budget and the Congres-
sional Budget Office differed, and to implement a sequestration order if that
became necessary.' 53 In Bowsher v. Synar,15 4 the Supreme Court held that the
assignment of these responsibilities to the Comptroller violated the separation of
powers doctrine because, under certain circumstances, he could be removed
from office by the unilateral action of Congress. As in Chadha, the Court em-
phasized the importance of insulating the branches from each other, even at the
expense of governmental efficiency.' 55
The reasoning underlying the Bowsher ruling ran as follows: (1) An officer
controlled by Congress may not constitutionally exercise executive power; (2)
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings vested the Comptroller General with executive
power; (3) the procedures for removing the Comptroller rendered him sub-
149. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, tit. II, 99 Stat.
1037, 1063, as amended by Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-119, 101 Stat. 754 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-922 (Supp. V 1987)).
150. In both absolute and relative terms, the deficit had reached previously unknown levels for the peacetime
economy. By 1985, the deficit exceeded $200 billion, a figure larger than the entire federal budget only 15 years
earlier. Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 76 CALIF. L. REv. 593,
596 (1988). As a percentage of gross national product, the deficit between 1980 and 1986 was more than 10 times
as large as it had been in the 1950s. See Ellwood, The Politics of the Enactment and Implementation of Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings: Why Congress Cannot Address the Deficit Dilemma, 25 HARV. J. ON LEuls. 553, 553 n.2
(1988). One contemporaneous official estimate projected that, under plausible budgetary and economic assump-
tions, the national debt would more than double between 1985 and 1990. Entin, supra note 15, at 706 n.28.
151. For detailed explanations of the operation of the Act, see Entin, supra note 15, at 706-09; Stith, supra
note 150, at 625-29.
152. Elliott, Why Our Separation of Powers Yurisprudence Is So Abysmal, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 506, 519
(1989); Stith, supra note 150, at 624 & n.191.
153. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 251, 99 Stat.
1037, 1063 (amended 1987).
154. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
155. The Court concluded its opinion in Bowsher by quoting its observation in Chadha that the efficiency,




servient to Congress; so (4) the Comptroller General could not perform the
functions assigned to him under the Act.15 For present purposes, the important
questions are the definition of the functions assigned to the Comptroller General
and the significance of the removal procedure.
Defining executive power, the Court emphasized that the Comptroller Gen-
eral would "[i]nterpre[t] a law enacted by Congress to implement the legisla-
tive mandate," which was "the very essence of 'execution' of the law."' 57 In one
sense, this definition is consistent with the view of executive power in Chadha,
which stressed that Congress could not participate in implementing one of its
laws except by passing a new statute.' 58 In another, however, it departs from
the Chadha approach by focusing upon the character of the action performed
rather than upon the identity of the actor performing it.
More troubling than this methodological inconsistency is the definition it-
self. After all, interpreting a law and applying it to a particular set of facts
describes adjudication at least as clearly as it does execution. 59 Further, defin-
ing the responsibilities of the Comptroller General under Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings as executive might imply that Congress would violate the Constitution
by reducing expenditures for specific federal programs in order to lower the
deficit. 160
Assuming that the Act conferred executive powers upon the Comptroller
General, however, the conclusion that the removal procedure rendered that offi-
cial subservient to Congress raises additional problems. At the most basic level,
the Constitution has very little to say about removal. The one explicit reference
to the subject states that all civil officers may be removed through impeach-
ment. 61 That solitary provision might implicitly exclude all other methods of
removal, but political practice from the First Congress onward rejected so nar-
row a view.162
Not until this century did the Supreme Court attempt to impose constitu-
tional ground rules in the area. In Myers v. United States,163 the Court invali-
156. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 721-34.
157. Id. at 733.
158. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954-55, 958 (1983).
159. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 56-57 (1932); Elliott, Regulating the Deficit After Bowsher v.
Synar, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 317, 325 (1987); Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers and the
Federal Courts, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 474, 482 (1989).
160. A separate aspect of the Bowsher decision shows that such congressional action would not violate the
Constitution. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings contained a fallback provision that established special procedures for
promulgating a sequestration order by joint resolution if the primary mechanism were invalidated. Bowsher, 478
U.S. at 718-19. The existence of the fallback provision persuaded the Court to invalidate the Comptroller Gen-
eral's role in implementing the statute rather than strike down the removal procedure. Id. at 735-36. For Justice
Stevens, the existence of these alternative methods of implementing the statute suggested that the duties at issue
had a "chameleon-like quality." Id. at 750 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). For further discussion of
these problems, see Entin, supra note 15, at 756-58, 782-84.
161. US. CoNsT. art. 11, § 4: "The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States shall
be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors."
162. See Entin, supra note 15, at 712-27.
163. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). For detailed analyses of this decision, see E. CORWIN. THE PRESIDENT'S REMOVAL
POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION (1927); J. HART, TENURE OF OFFICE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION (1930); En-
tin, supra note 15, at 728-38.
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dated a statute that required the advice and consent of the Senate as a prereq-
uisite to the dismissal of most local postmasters. Underlying this ruling was the
proposition that the President possessed unfettered power to remove those non-
judicial appointees who assisted in the performance of his constitutional obliga-
tion faithfully to execute the laws."" The subsequent ruling in Humphrey's Ex-
ecutor v. United States 65 upheld a cause requirement for the removal of
members of the Federal Trade Commission. In so doing, the Court limited the
rule of Myers to "purely executive" officers.' 66
The statute creating the position of Comptroller General specified that the
incumbent could be removed, other than by impeachment, only for cause and
only through the passage of a joint resolution. 6 7 Because a joint resolution is
subject to the bicameralism and presentation requirements applicable to a
bill, 68 Congress has the initiative over the process of removing the Comptroller
and could oust that official over the determined opposition of the President. The
Court in Bowsher therefore viewed the statute as authorizing the legislative
branch alone to dismiss the Comptroller.' Because the power to remove was
the power to control, this procedure rendered the Comptroller "subservient to
Congress." 170 It followed that this subservience precluded the Comptroller from
exercising the executive functions conferred upon him by Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings.17'
The Court virtually apologized for the inconvenience of this conclusion,
which it regarded as following inexorably from fundamental constitutional
premises.' 71 In a purely formal sense, the reasoning in Bowsher does follow
from Myers and Humphrey's Executor, whatever the infirmities of those opin-
ions. A system that values adherence to precedent should attach some weight to
this fact. Yet a closer look suggests that the procedure for removing the Comp-
troller General posed few separation of powers risks.
To begin with, while the officials in those earlier cases actually had been
dismissed, the Comptroller has remained securely in place both before and since
the Bowsher litigation. More fundamentally, the real significance of the power
to remove has been greatly exaggerated. Presidents can control their appointees
164. Myers, 272 U.S. at 117.
165. 295 U.S. 602 (1935). The scholarly reaction to this opinion has been almost uniformly negative. See.
e.g., Gifford, The Separation of Powers Doctrine and the Regulatory Agencies After Bowsher v. Synar, 55 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 441, 459-61 (1987); Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 Sup. CT. REv. 41, 92-94; Nathanson,
supra note 110, at 1100-01; Strauss, supra note 23, at 611-12. See generally Entin, supra note 15, at 738-49.
166. Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 628. The Court later held that presidential appointees exercising adjudi-
catory functions enjoyed protection against arbitrary discharge. Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
For further discussion of this case, see Entin, supra note 15, at 749-52.
167. 31 U.S.C. § 703(e)(1) (1982). The statutory grounds include permanent disability, inefficiency, neglect
of duty, malfeasance, and conduct involving moral turpitude. The middle three grounds are identical to the provi-
sions justifying the removal of members of the Federal Trade Commission that were upheld in Humphrey's Exec-
utor. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1982).
168. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 28 (1947); 7 DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES 333-34 (1977).
169. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 728 & n.7 (1986).
170. Id. at 730; see also id. at 726.
171. Id. at 732.
172. See id. at 722, 736.
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more effectively by means other than dismissing or threatening to dismiss them.
Removals have costs as well as benefits, a fact that makes the importance of
who may discharge officials and on what grounds a matter more of symbolic
than of substantive significance.'" 8 Further, even if the President had the sole
and unfettered power to remove, Congress retains a broad array of theoretically
less drastic but empirically more useful controls over the salary and working
conditions of officials exercising executive power, controls that could effectively
force such officials to resign even when the President earnestly desired them to
remain .
74
This does not mean that direct congressional participation in the removal
of executive officers is entirely benign, as the experience under the Tenure of
Office Act'75 demonstrates. Nevertheless, when Bowsher was decided no Comp-
troller General had been removed or even threatened with removal in the sixty-
five years since the position was created. 7 6 Moreover, a broad array of institu-
tional factors-including the Comptroller's right to a pretermination hearing,
the difficulty of mustering the two-thirds vote in both houses to oust him over
presidential opposition, and his ineligibility for reappointment-militate against
the notion that the Comptroller is subservient to Congress and therefore might
trim his sails in performing his duties under the deficit-reduction law. 17 7
173. Entin, supra note 15, at 777-81. But see Blumoff, Illusions of Constitutional Decisionmaking Politics
and the Tenure Powers in the Court, 73 IOWA L. REv. 1079, 1080 n.4 (1988).
From the President's standpoint, the political cost of removals and the availability of less drastic alternative
controls help to explain the low incidence of actual dismissals. From the perspective of a presidential appointee,
the paucity of removals reduces the effectiveness of even the threat of discharge as a means of deterring conduct
that might warrant removal from office. This reasoning would follow by analogy to the idea of a link between
effective enforcement and deterrence in the criminal law. See H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANC-
TION 286-88 (1968); F. ZIMRINO & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE 160-61 (1973). But see PANEL ON RESEARCH ON
DETERRENT AND INCAPACITATIVE EFFECTS, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION:
ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 4-8, 22-59 (1978) (demonstrating the diffi-
culty of proving a causal link between risk of noncapital sanctions and deterrence of criminal behavior); id. at 8-9,
59-63 (analyzing the difficulty of determining the deterrent effect of capital punishment). Of course, especially
risk-averse presidential appointees might be deterred from doing anything that presents even a remote risk of
removal. Cf S. KADISH & S. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 151 (5th ed. 1989) ("certainty of
punishment is important only as it contributes to the appearance of certainty"); F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS,
supra, at 161-63 (emphasizing the importance of subjective as well as objective judgments in assessing deterrent
effects).
174. Entin. supra note 15, at 760. All of these devices are entirely consistent with the reasoning of Myers.
See id. at 734. In addition, Chief Justice Taft's opinion for the Court in that ease recognized that Congress could
defeat the President's unfettered prerogative to remove many of his nonjudicial appointees by the simple expedient
of denominating them inferior officers chosen by department heads rather than by the chief executive. See Myers
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 126-27 (1926); see also W. TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HisPowERS 70-71
(1916) (suggesting that the President be required to appoint only cabinet members and a single undersecretary in
each department, with all other offices filled by civil servants having permanent tenure).
175. Ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430 (1867), amended by Act of Apr. 5, 1869, ch. 10, 16 Stat. 6, repealed by Act of
Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 353, 24 Stat. 500.
176. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 778, 784 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Entin, supra note 15, at 760 & n.263.
177. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 770-73 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 784-85 & n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
At the same time, the Comptroller traditionally has enjoyed a close relationship with Congress. The Court
correctly remarked that both the legislative branch and various Comptrollers have commented upon that relation-
ship, Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 731-32, one reflected in the wide range of other functions which that official performs
for Congress, see id. at 741-45 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). This raises the possibility that the
Comptroller might show excessive sensitivity to the perceived wishes of the legislature in performing his duties
under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, notwithstanding the countervailing factors discussed in the text. Any uncer-
tainty over the Comptroller's incentives might have suggested that litigation concerning his subservience was pre-
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Unfortunately, the Court's single-minded focus upon the abstract details of
the removal provision obscured a more significant separation of powers issue
raised by Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. This statute effectively enabled elected of-
ficials charged with making fundamental judgments about the size and shape of
government to avoid their responsibilities by delegating those judgments to ap-
pointed officials who are not directly accountable to the electorate. This view
suggests that the budget occupies so important a place in our system that the
political branches may not delegate their responsibility to make budgetary deci-
sions of the magnitude contemplated by Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. 7 1 Although
the Act was attacked on more traditional delegation grounds, the Court did not
discuss the merits of this claim.' 7 9
Resolving this issue would have posed real difficulties. Indeed, acceptance
of the notion that the political branches may not delegate fundamental budget-
ary decisions might have called into question the validity of other aspects of the
administrative state. The existence of precedents on removal provided a conven-
tional, if unsatisfying, basis for the result in Bowsher.80 Nevertheless, the im-
plausibility of the assumptions underlying the Court's removal jurisprudence
suggests that these decisions embody an enormous legal fiction. Still, many
commentators view the resolution of the debate over the removal power as es-
sential to the preservation of a unitary executive and the maintenance of liberty
under a regime of separated powers.""1 Perhaps this view is correct, but the
limited empirical significance of this power makes it a small tail to wag so large
a dog.18 2
mature. See Elliott, supra note 159, at 332-36. The Court, however, dismissed the ripeness question in a footnote.
Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 727 n.5.
178. For further discussion of this point and of the difficulty of drawing principled distinctions between those
functions that are delegable and those that are not, see Entin, supra note 15, at 784-90.
179. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 736 n.10. The dissenters dismissed this claim in footnotes. Id. at 764 n.5
(White, J., dissenting); id. at 778 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The district court rejected the delegation argu-
ment on the merits. Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1385-89 (D.D.C. 1986) (3-judge court).
180. For efforts to construct a less troublesome rationale for the result in Bowsher, see Strauss, supra note
10, at 498-500, 519-21; Sunstein, supra note 3, at 496.
181. E.g., Currie, The Distribution of Powers After Bowsher, 1986 Sup. CT. REV. 19, 34-36; Miller, supra
note 165, at 58-63, 96-97.
This view is not confined to academics. The arguments in Bowsher implicitly raised questions concerning the
constitutionality of so-called independent agencies. It will be recalled that Humphrey's Executor upheld the valid-
ity of for-cause removal provisions for members of the FTC. That ruling provided a judicial imprimatur for such
agencies. Verkuil, The Status of Independent Agencies After Bowsher v. Synar, 1986 DUKE LJ. 779, 781-82. In
Bowsher, the Solicitor General hinted that he shared those constitutional doubts but did not expressly urge the
overruling of Humphrey's Executor. Brief for the United States at 46 n.32, Bowsher, 478 U.S. 714 (No. 85-
1377). The implications of the Solicitor General's position elicited extensive discussion at oral argument, see
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act - Separation of Powers, 54 U.S.L.W. 3709, 3710 (1986), and prompted the
Court to include a footnote disavowing any intention to cast doubt on the constitutionality of independent agen-
cies, Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 725 n.4.
Despite the Solicitor General's diffidence, other executive-branch officials have expressed hostility toward the
idea of such agencies. See Miller, supra note 165, at 47-48; Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective,
38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1319 n.471 (1986); Verkuil, supra, at 788-90.
182. Some analysts have urged increased presidential participation in coordinating and implementing policy
based upon conceptions of executive power in which the removal question occupies a distinctly secondary place.
E.g., Strauss, supra note 23, at 599-602, 653-67; Sunstein, supra note 3, at 452-63.
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D. The Independent Counsel and the Control of Prosecution
As the discussion of Buckley indicated, the legacy of Watergate included
legislation designed to remedy campaign fund-raising abuses. That scandal also
prompted passage of a measure requiring the appointment of an independent
counsel in any future case involving credible allegations of criminal misbehavior
by persons in or close to the White House. The independent counsel provision
was an important part of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978,183 which was
adopted out of concern that the Department of Justice had not dealt adequately
with Watergate-related matters. "" In essence, this provision sought to insulate
the Department from politically sensitive cases on the theory that the executive
branch cannot be trusted to investigate itself.'8 5
The Court upheld the constitutionality of this arrangement in Morrison v.
Olson.18  The reasoning supporting this conclusion differed conspicuously from
the approach taken in Chadha and Bowsher. Rather than emphasizing the es-
sential separateness of the branches, the opinion focused upon whether the inde-
pendent counsel system unduly interfered with the performance of executive
functions. 187 As in the earlier cases taking this tack, Morrison did not define
how much interference would violate the Constitution. Perhaps more strikingly,
it gave only cursory attention to the purposes of the separation of powers doc-
trine and the justification for the disputed statute. The Court's essentially ad
hoc balancing approach elicited a passionate dissent from Justice Scalia, who
lamented what he saw as the demise of "our former constitutional system."'188
The constitutional objection to the independent counsel law rested upon the
proposition that law enforcement is a quintessentially executive function and
that the Ethics Act impermissibly deprives the President of control over that
function. The argument emphasized that the Constitution vested "[t]he execu-
tive power" in the President,'89 who also was given the duty to "take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed."'a 0 The constitutional infirmity arose because
the statute conferred the power to appoint an independent counsel upon a spe-
cial court' 9' and limited the grounds upon which such a counsel could be re-
183. Pub. L. No. 95-521, tit. VI, 92 Stat. 1824. 1867-73 (1978) (current version codified at 28 U.S.C. §9
591-599 (Supp. V 1987)).
184. The Ethics Act also imposed substantive restrictions upon the activities of high-level executive officials
after they leave government. Those provisions are beyond the scope of this discussion but they present important
questions in their own right. See, e.g., United States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir.), cert..denied, 110 S.
Ct. 564 (1989).
185. See In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 527 (D.C. Cir.) (Ruth Bader Ginsburg, J., dissenting), rev'd sub
nom. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988); cf. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 467 (checks on abuse of authority
are justified in part because "foxes should not guard henhouses").
The Act applies to eases involving the President and Vice-President as well as to persons holding cabinet and
subcabinet rank and to top officials of the President's campaign organization. 28 U.S.C. § 591 (b) (Supp. V 1987).
186. 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
187. Id. at 2620-22.
188. Id. at 2631 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
189. US. CONsT. art. ii, § I, cl. 1.
190. Id. § 3. Although Justice Sealia did not rely upon this provision, the lower court emphasized this presi-
dential duty as an important basis for invalidating the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics Act. In re
Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 488-89 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
191. See 28 U.S.C. § 49 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
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moved.' 92 Accordingly, this arrangement was said to contravene the teachings
of both Buckley and Myers by conferring duties exercisable only by an officer
of the United States upon someone chosen in violation of the constitutionally
mandated procedure for selecting such officials, and by limiting the grounds
upon which a person performing purely executive functions could be dismissed.
Although it conceded that the independent counsel performed executive
functions, 193 the Morrison opinion rebuffed these objections. The selection pro-
cedure complied with constitutional strictures because an independent counsel is
an inferior officer having limited duties, jurisdiction, and tenure, and subject to
removal for cause by the Attorney General. 94 The removal provision was no
more troublesome even though an independent counsel might be thought to hold
a "purely executive" office. Despite apparently contrary language in
Humphrey's Executor,' 5 the Court stated its "present considered view"'' 96 that
for-cause limitations upon removal should pass muster unless "they impede the
President's ability to perform his constitutional duty."'' 9 Under this flexible
standard, neither the removal limitation nor the statute taken as a whole "un-
duly trammel[ed] on executive authority."' 98
The formalist objection to this analysis gains some force from the elliptical
quality of the majority opinion. If investigation and prosecution of possible vio-
lations of the criminal law are quintessentially executive functions, the prospect
of an independent counsel appointed by a court and subject to only limited pres-
idential control appears deeply problematical in a government with a supposedly
unitary executive.199 The Court's reliance upon a relatively indeterminate bal-
ancing approach, coupled with its somewhat diffident treatment of the concerns
over the possible conflict of interest inherent in having the Attorney General
192. An independent counsel is removable "only by the personal action of the Attorney General and only for
good cause, physical disability, mental incapacity, or any other condition that substantially impairs the perform-
ance of such independent counsel's duties." Id. § 596(a)(1). The decision to discharge an independent counsel is
subject to review by the special court. Id. § 596(a)(3).
193. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2619.
194. Id. at 2608-09. This conclusion is less than obvious, but neither is it implausible. See Blumoff, supra
note 173, at 1156-60. The Ethics Act confers upon an independent counsel the "full power" of the Attorney
General and the Department of Justice in all matters within the counsel's jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a) (Supp.
V 1987). In that sense, an independent counsel is not truly subordinate to anyone in the executive branch and thus
might be viewed as an officer of the United States rather than as an inferior officer. See Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at
2631-35 (Scalia, J., dissenting). At the same time the Court has characterized as inferior officers some officials
who lacked any clearly identifiable superiors. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397-98 (1880) (commissioners
appointed to oversee congressional election). Hence, subordinateness may not be a necessary attribute of an infer-
ior officer.
195. See Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627-28 (1935).
196. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2618.
197. Id. at 2619.
198. Id. In assessing the Ethics Act as a whole, the Court emphasized that the executive branch retains
"sufficient control over the independent counsel to ensure that the President is able to perform his constitutionally
assigned duties" with respect to law enforcement. Id. at 2622.
199. See Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2626-28, 2629-31, 2636-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Carter, The
Independent Counsel Mesv, 102 HARV. L. REV. 105, 108-16 (1988); Liberman, Morrison v. Olson: A Formalistic
Perspective on Why the Court Was Wrong, 38 AM. U.L. REV. 313, 314-17, 352-58 (1989).
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supervising investigations of the administration of which he is part, 00 might
contribute to the difficulty.
A more complete argument based upon both the conflict-of-interest prob-
lem and the values served by the separation of powers might have proceeded
along the following lines. The Constitution sought to diffuse power, among other
purposes, to prevent the accumulation of unchecked authority that could lead to
oppression and tyranny. The prospect of the executive branch investigating itself
poses a risk of self-interested decisionmaking that could result in unjustified
failures to pursue wrongdoing by government officials. Although the President
has the duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,"20 ' that duty
restricts his discretion to dispense with or refuse to enforce applicable laws.202
Meanwhile, Congress may "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into Execution . . . all . . . Powers vested" in the federal govern-
ment or any federal officer, including the President.203
On this reasoning, Congress could, as it did in the Ethics Act, pass a stat-
ute conferring limited authority upon a court to appoint and supervise an inde-
pendent counsel, particularly when the Attorney General alone determines
whether an independent counsel will be appointed at all20 4 and the Attorney
General's recommendation provides the basis for defining the counsel's jurisdic-
tion.20 5 The removal procedure, under which the Attorney General may dismiss
but only for cause, recognizes the executive branch's authority while protecting
against the arbitrary discharge of an official occupying a potentially vulnerable
position.20 6 Moreover, the statute can be said to minimize the risk of congres-
200. The Court discussed conflict-of-interest considerations only in connection with the challenge to the
method of selecting an independent counsel. After concluding that an independent counsel may properly be char-
acterized as an inferior officer, the majority found no unconstitutional "incongruity" in the provision empowering
the special court to make the appointment. The language of the appointments clause did not preclude judicial
appointment of an official performing executive functions, and "the most logical place to put [the appointing
authority that Congress was unwilling in this instance to entrust to the President] was in the Judicial Branch."
Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2611.
201. US. CoNsT. art. II, § 3.
202. Shane, The Separation of Powers and the Rule of Law: The Virtues of "Seeing the Trees", 30 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 375, 380 (1989); Sunstein, supra note 3, at 476; Tiefer, The Constitutionality ofIndependent
Officers as Checks on Abuses of Executive Power, 63 B.U.L. REv. 59, 90 (1983).
203. US. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
204. An independent counsel may be appointed only upon the request of the Attorney General. 28 U.S.C. §§
592(a)-(d), 593(b)(1) (Supp. V 1987). The special court may not appoint an independent counsel on its own
initiative, and the Attorney General's decision not to seek such an appointment is immune from judicial review.
Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1986); Banzhaf v. Smith, 737 F.2d 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
205. The special court defines, and may expand, an independent counsel's jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)-
(c) (Supp. V 1987). An independent counsel may not obtain jurisdiction over any matter or individual in the face
of objections by the Attorney General, however. Id. § 593(c)(2)(B); see also In re Olson, 818 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
206. See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958) (inferring protection against arbitrary discharge for
officials performing adjudication from statute under which officials were appointed despite absence of provision
relating to removal): L. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 253 (2d ed. 1988); Tiefer, supra note 202, at
96-97.
The Ethics Act authorizes the special court to review the Attorney General's decision to remove an indepen-
dent counsel. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(3) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). This provision does not seem troublesome, although
the prospect of judicial review might well deter the Attorney General from removing an independent counsel. A
substantial body of statutory and case law now exists that any executive official might invoke in an effort to obtain
judicial review of his ouster. E.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Board of Regents v.
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sional aggrandizement by conferring authority upon a court rather than the leg-
islature. Thus, the independent counsel provision encroaches only minimally
upon executive autonomy in an area where unfettered executive authority
presents foreseeable risks to the rule of law.
This conclusion gains additional vitality from an important historical fact:
The practices of the states and the early federal government raise serious doubts
that law enforcement really is a quintessentially executive function. Perhaps due
to the arguments presented in the Morrison litigation, it was generally accepted
that the powers at issue were executive.20 7 Those arguments, in turn, might
have been shaped by the many judicial statements to this effect. 20 8 In fact, how-
ever, both at the time the Constitution was ratified and for decades thereafter,
several states provided for the appointment of prosecutors by courts or legisla-
tive bodies. 20 9 At the national level, the executive branch, in the person of the
Attorney General, did not gain centralized control over litigation involving the
federal government until 1870.210 Before then, most federal litigation was con-
ducted on a part-time basis by private practitioners who had little contact with
the President or other executive officials. 11 In England during the late eight-
eenth century, private prosecution of criminal cases was common, a practice
undoubtedly known to the framers.2 12 For many years after the ratification of
the Constitution, private citizens played an important role in enforcing federal
criminal laws,2 13 and Congress assigned numerous law enforcement responsibili-
ties to state officials who were not subject to plenary presidential control.2 14 This
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 317-18 (1903); Reagan v. United States,
182 U.S. 419, 426 (1901).
207. See supra text accompanying note 193. Judge Ginsburg, dissenting in the court of appeals, also viewed
prosecution as "indisputably an executive task" but questioned whether it was a "core" function of that branch. In
re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 526 (D.C. Cir.) (Ruth Bader Ginsburg, J., dissenting), revd sub nom. Morrison v.
Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
208. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974); The Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
454, 458-59 (1869); Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841 (1967); United
States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nim. Cox v. Hauberg, 381 U.S. 935 (1965).
209. Gwyn, supra note 159, at 494-99; Shane, Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power: A Consti-
tutional Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 603-05 (1989).
210. P. KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 101 (1978); Tiefer, supra note 202, at 91.
211. Sealed Case, 838 F.2d at 526-27 (Ruth Bader Ginsburg, J., dissenting); L. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS
406-11 (1948); Bruff, Independent Counsel and the Constitution, 24 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 539, 558 (1988);
Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons from History, 38 AM. U.L. REv. 275,
286-90 (1989). The lack of centralized executive direction is reflected in the refusal of Attorney General William
Wirt to respond to an inquiry from a federal district attorney. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 608, 609-11 (1823), cited in
Krent, supra note 124, at 1319 n.273.
212. Gwyn, supra note 159, at 500-01; Krent, supra note 211, at 290-92; Shane, supra note 202, at 379;
Comment, The Outmoded Concept of Private Prosecution, 25 AM. U.L. REv. 754, 758 (1976).
213. See Krent, supra note 211, at 292-303.
Even today control over federal criminal prosecution is not completely centralized. The Supreme Court has
recently upheld the validity of judicial appointment of private attorneys to prosecute cases of criminal contempt.
Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 793-801 (1987). In addition, United States
Attorneys retain considerable autonomy in the conduct of litigation despite their nominal subservience to the
Attorney General. Bruff, supra note 211, at 558-59. Further, many federal agencies have the right to go to court
without clearance from the Department of Justice. Tiefer, supra note 202, at 91-92.
214. Krent, supra note 211, at 304-06, 308-10; see also Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and the State
Courts, 38 HARV. L. REV. 545, 551-75 (1925).
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historical record, if it does not refute the formalist objections to the Ethics Act,
at least weakens them considerably.
However those objections are resolved, a more subtle, and to many modern
minds more troubling, argument also has been advanced against the indepen-
dent counsel mechanism. An independent counsel focuses upon a specific indi-
vidual. The counsel, by virtue of her independence, does not operate under the
constraints that affect prosecutors subject to presidential supervision and the
traditions of the Department of Justice which operate to temper excessive zeal.
Thus, the independent counsel's professional isolation, lack of political account-
ability, and need to justify the existence of the office pose severe threats to the
due process rights of officials subject to the Ethics Act.215
One might respond to this concern in three ways. First, this due process
argument implies that overzealous independent counsel will single out accused
officials for unreasonably harsh treatment. Yet the Supreme Court generally
has reacted skeptically to claims of selective enforcement 216 and prosecutorial
vindictiveness. 17 Thus, whatever the cogency of the due process argument, this
objection cannot justify facial invalidation of the independent counsel provisions
of the Ethics Act.
Second, experience under the Act suggests that these concerns are at least
premature. Several investigations by independent counsel have concluded with-
out indictment, even in situations in which the counsel elected as a matter of
discretion not to proceed despite evidence of statutory violations. 218 Indeed, in at
least one case the target of allegations of wrongdoing actually requested the
appointment of an independent counsel to clear the air. 19 The record to date is
not conclusive, of course, and one conviction obtained by an independent coun-
sel has been overturned on appeal. 220 These due process questions nevertheless
raise legitimate concerns. At this point, though, the validity of those concerns
remains unclear.
Third, these due process objections might prove too much. Any special
prosecutor appointed to investigate alleged wrongdoing by executive officials
will function outside the framework and institutional traditions of the Depart-
ment of Justice. Thus, all of the due process vices inherent in the Ethics Act
would apply to a special prosecutor appointed by the President or Attorney
General. Yet Justice Scalia, who so strenuously denounced the Ethics Act, ac-
cepted the legitimacy of special prosecutors chosen in response to political pres-
sure on the executive branch.22' This apparent inconsistency does not destroy
215. These objections are distilled from the final section of Justice Scalia's opinion in Morrison. See Morri-
son v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2637-40 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
216. See. e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-10 (1985); United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S.
114, 123-25 (1979).
217. See, e.g., Alabama v. Smith, 109 S. Ct. 2201 (1989); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978);
Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1972). But see Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 24-29 (1974).
218. The most celebrated example to date involves the decision of independent counsel James McKay not to
seek indictments against former Attorney General Edwin Meese. See Report of Independent Counsel In re Edwin
Meese Ill at 51-52, 73-76, 95-99 (D.C. Cir. Indep. Couns. Div. July 5, 1988).
219. See Deaver v. Seymour, 822 F.2d 66, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
220. United States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 564 (1989).
221. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the objection to the Ethics Act, but it does suggest that perhaps a deeper fault
in the statute arises from the scope of its coverage and the threshold for its
invocation rather than from the procedures for selecting and removing an inde-
pendent counsel. These concerns, however, may go more to the wisdom of the
Act than to its constitutionality. We shall return to this issue in Part III.
E. Sentencing, Taxing, and Delegation
The final set of cases to be discussed arose last Term and presented chal-
lenges to federal statutes on delegation grounds. One concerned the constitu-
tionality of criminal sentencing guidelines promulgated by a special commission,
the other the validity of user fees promulgated by the Secretary of Transporta-
tion. Although the Court rejected those challenges, the cases are significant
nonetheless because they could encourage the belief that political decisions are
too important to be left to elected officials.
The first decision, Mistretta v. United States,22 upheld the constitutional-
ity of the United States Sentencing Commission, a seven-member body empow-
ered to issue legally binding guidelines that establish maximum and minimum
sentences for federal crimes.22 Sentencing judges may deviate from the guide-
lines in certain circumstances but must specifically explain such deviations.224
Failure to comply with the guidelines or adequately to explain deviations from
them are grounds for appellate reversal.225
In a straightforward application of modern delegation analysis, the Court
found that Congress had provided "sufficiently specific and detailed" standards
for the Commission's work.22 In particular, the legislature had articulated
three goals and four purposes for the new sentencing system,227 and directed the
Commission to develop a range of sentences for different categories of offenses
and various types of offenders according to general criteria prescribed in the
statute.228 Having done this much, Congress "especially appropriate[ly]" dele-
gated the "intricate, labor-intensive task" of developing proportionate sanctions
for hundreds of crimes and thousands of offenders "to an expert body." 229
222. 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989).
223. The Commission is located in the judicial branch. Its members, three of whom must be article III
judges, are appointed by the President subject to Senate confirmation; they are subject to presidential removal
from the Commission only for cause. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (Supp. V 1987). Although the Court devoted most of its
opinion to the location, composition, and independence of the Commission, see Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 661-75,
those questions relate only secondarily to the problem of separation of powers conflicts between Congress and the
President. For that reason, they will receive little direct attention here. For more comprehensive discussions of
these issues, see Krent, supra note 124, at 1311-16; Pierce, Morrison v. Olson, Separation of Powers, and the
Structure of Government, 1988 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 35-38; Student Essay, The Constitutionality of the U.S. Sentenc-
ing Commission: An Analysis of the Role of the Judiciary, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 704, 712-30 (1989); Note,
The Constitutional Infirmities of the United States Sentencing Commission, 96 YALE LJ. 1363, 1376-88 (1987).
224. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (Supp. V 1987).
225. Id. § 3742.
226. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 655.
227. Id. at 655-56 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1) (Supp. V 1987)).
228. Id. at 656-57 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 994 (Supp. V 1987)).
229. Id. at 658.
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This conclusion should have come as no surprise. Although numerous judi-
cial statements aver that Congress may not delegate the legislative power,2 30 the
Court has actually found an unconstitutional delegation only twice."3 ' More-
over, the cases have used a variety of tests to avoid striking down legislative
delegations. 23 Since the New Deal, the focus has changed from rhetorical con-
demnation toward a search for standards and procedures to prevent arbitrary
administration and promote accountability, with particular emphasis upon the
availability of judicial review.233 As a practical matter, the delegation doctrine
is moribund as a device for invalidating federal legislation.234
Although the lack-of-standards challenge succumbed without difficulty, the
duties assigned to the Sentencing Commission raised an alternative concern that
the Court did not address. Congress alone has the power to declare federal
crimes.2 3 5 Congress alone, therefore, may determine the permissible sentences
230. Perhaps the classic statement of this position came in Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892): "That
Congress cannot delegate legislative power . . . is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and
maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution."
231. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293
U.S. 388 (1935). See also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) (suggesting the unconstitutional-
ity of delegations to private groups); but cf. United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 577-78
(1939) (upholding validity of a delegation to private parties).
232. Among these have been the "named contingency" test, see Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 693 (1892)
(upholding a statute allowing the President to suspend duty-free importation of goods from any nation that did not
accord reciprocally fair treatment to U.S. goods); The Brig Aurora, I1 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 383 (1813) (uphold-
ing statute permitting President to lift trade embargoes against England and France when those nations "ceased
to violate the neutral commerce of the United States"), the "legislative standards" test, see Mahler v. Eby, 264
U.S. 32, 40 (1924) (finding ambiguous statutory standards for deportation of undesirable aliens to derive meaning
from "common understanding"); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517 (1911) (upholding preservation
regulations for national forests, the violation of which was a criminal offense, as an exercise of executive power to
"fill in the details"); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 496-97 (1904) (approving delegation authorizing Sec-
retary of the Treasury to establish uniform standards for importation of tea in circumstances when "named con-
tingency" test could not have been met), and the "intelligible principle" test, see J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v.
United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (upholding delegation to President to adjust tariff rates to equalize
differences in cost of production of foreign and domestic products).
233. The leading example of this approach is Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). The Mistretta
decision relied heavily upon Yakus in its discussion of the delegation issue and quoted at length from the opinion
in that ease as the basis for resolving that issue. See Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 655, 658 (1989).
234. Perhaps the most striking illustration of this development is Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally,
337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971) (3-judge court), which upheld a delegation to the President "to issue such orders
and regulations [implementing wage and price controls] as he deems appropriate," based upon a "common lore"
of earlier price control regimes and the availability of judicial review of the orders and regulations actually issued.
The delegation doctrine is not entirely dead, however. The Court occasionally invokes the doctrine as a justifi-
cation for narrowing the scope of seemingly broad statutory delegations. E.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17-18
(1965); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 583-85 (1963); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129-30 (1958); see also
Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 645-46 (1980). In addition, some
separate opinions have relied upon delegation arguments. E.g., American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S.
490, 546-47 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst.,
448 U.S. 607, 685-87 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 275 (1967)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
Finally, in its decision invalidating the legislative veto, the Court distinguished rulemaking performed by
administrative agencies from congressional action subject to the bicameralism and presentation requirements in
part on the basis that rulemaking was subject to the delegation doctrine. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16 (1983). Despite the implications of this statement, the cases discussed in the text
of this section demonstrate that the delegation doctrine has not enjoyed a recent revival.
235. There are no federal common law crimes. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32
(1812); see W. LAFAVE & A. Scor, JR. CRIMINAL LAW § 2.1(c), at 66 & n.17 (2d ed. 1986).
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for federal crimes, a task which implicates fundamental moral judgments ap-
propriately made only by officials who are directly accountable to the people in
whose name those judgments are made.2 36 The sentencing guidelines, like the
sequestration process created by Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, transferred impor-
tant decisions from elected, politically accountable officials to appointed experts.
Accordingly, even if the intricacy of the task required the assistance of special-
ists, Congress and the President should have taken the ultimate responsibility
for fixing allowable sentences for persons convicted of federal crimes by for-
mally adopting the guidelines through the legislative process."'
This objection to the sentencing guidelines comes close to suggesting that
determining the acceptable magnitude of criminal sanctions is a nondelegable
function. As an initial proposition, this argument was unpromising because the
Court long ago had approved the delegation to an executive department of au-
thority to promulgate regulations the violation of which would give rise to crim-
inal liability.23 In a different setting, however, the Court more recently had
implied that Congress could not delegate the taxing power.2 39 Analogous rea-
soning might have led to the conclusion that the political branches could not
wholly delegate the responsibility for determining the range of permissible crim-
inal sentences. Last Term's other delegation decision cast doubt upon any such
implication.
In Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 240 the Court unanimously re-
jected the argument that delegations of the taxing power are subject to more
stringent requirements than are other delegations. Mid-America Pipeline con-
cerned the constitutionality of a statute directing the Secretary of Transporta-
tion to impose user fees upon pipeline operators to cover the cost of administer-
ing pipeline safety programs.24 ' The challenge maintained that the user fees
were really taxes essentially because, without the fees, the safety programs
would have been supported by taxpayer funds. The Court found nothing in the
language or structure of article I suggesting special hostility to delegations of
the taxing power and pointedly remarked that from the First Congress onward
the legislature has delegated considerable discretion to the executive under the
tax laws.242 Because the statute at issue contained ample standards under tradi-
236. See, e.g., Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689 (1980); Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393
(1958); Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42 (1916).
237. Alternatively, the power to promulgate the sentencing guidelines involved a delegation of purely legisla-
tive power, not of the ancillary power to make rules in connection with the exercise of executive or legislative
power. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 678-79 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
238. E.g., United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911); see also Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp.
1374, 1385-86 (D.D.C.) (3-judge court) (discussing Supreme Court decisions upholding delegation of allegedly
nondelegable functions), affid sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
239. See National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340-41 (1974).
240. 109 S. Ct. 1726 (1989).
241. Consolidated Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, § 7005, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1682a (Supp. V 1987). This
provision directed the Secretary to fix the fees at a level sufficient to cover the costs of administering these pro-
grams but limited their aggregate amount to 5% above the maximum expenditures for that purpose provided in
the statute. The goal was to make these programs self-financing without providing a windfall for the treasury. See
Mid-America Pipeline, 109 S. Ct. at 1728-29.
242. Mid-America Pipeline, 109 S. Ct. at 1732-33. The Court found National Cable Television, see supra
note 239 and accompanying text, entirely compatible with this analysis. The fees at issue in that case inured in
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tional delegation principles to constrain the Secretary's discretion, it survived
the constitutional attack.
In short, these cases continue the Court's consistent rejection of delegation
challenges. Despite the urging of various commentators,243 the Supreme Court
has essentially abandoned the delegation doctrine as a meaningful approach to
separation of powers problems. Judicial reluctance to apply the doctrine does
not necessarily render the concern over delegation any less genuine. Rather, it
may reflect the difficulty of fashioning meaningful judicial criteria for applying
the doctrine to situations involving less "a point of principle [than] a question of
degree." 2 ' This lesson may have more general application in separation of pow-
ers disputes.
III. CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Perhaps "[i] t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial depart-
ment to say what the law is,"'24 5 but the discussion in Part II suggests that the
Supreme Court's efforts to define the allocation of power between the legislative
and executive branches have left the law in an unsatisfactory state. This condi-
tion arises less from the idiosyncrasies or intellectual deficiencies of judges than
from the intractable nature of the subject.24 6 No unitary judicial approach to
this subject can take account of its logical and empirical complexities. Unlike
individual rights and perhaps also federalism disputes,2 4 7 Congress and the
President possess ample political resources with which to protect their interests.
For this reason, and because the legislature and the chief executive also have
the practical wisdom to determine for themselves the stakes of any particular
controversy, courts should hesitate to insist upon comprehensive resolution of
constitutional turf battles between the political branches. More important, the
political branches themselves and the citizenry at large should hesitate to seek
judicial resolution of these issues.
The following sections first explore various unsuccessful efforts to reconcile
the recent separation of powers jurisprudence, next suggest that less enthusiasm
for judicial resolution of these disputes might have encouraged more meaningful
dialogue between Congress and the President, and finally urge that the focus
upon the constitutional issues at stake in these cases tended to obscure more
mundane, but also more significant, objections to the wisdom of the governmen-
part to the benefit of the public, but the statute under which they were imposed did not clearly enough indicate
congressional intent to authorize recovery from regulated parties of the cost of benefits conferred upon society at
large. In Mid-America Pipeline, by contrast, the statute reflected an intention to make the pipeline safety pro-
grams self-financing. Mid-America Pipeline, 109 S. Ct. at 1733-34.
243. E.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRusT 131-34 (1980); T. LOwi, THE END OF LIBERALISM 92-126,
300-01 (2d ed. 1979); Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 146; Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine:
Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223 (1985).
244. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 677 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Stewart, The
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1667, 1693-97 (1975).
245. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), quoted in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683, 703, 705 (1974).
246. See Bradley, The Uncertainty Principle in the Supreme Court, 1986 DUKE LJ. 1, 27-28; Easterbrook,
Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 805-07 (1982).
247. See supra note 24.
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tal policies in question. Accepting the premises of this discussion would not as-
sure more intelligent public policies, but it would increase the likelihood that
such policies would emerge.
A. The Difficulty of Reconciling the Cases
The recent Supreme Court decisions addressing separation of powers dis-
putes between the legislative and executive branches have employed distinctive
analytical techniques. At times, the Court has applied a strictly formal ap-
proach emphasizing the essential separateness of the branches and underscoring
the importance of allowing each to function as master in its own sphere. At
others, the Court has followed a more pragmatic course focusing upon the exis-
tence of checks and balances to prevent the accumulation of unopposed author-
ity that could lead to arbitrary action by a single branch. The analytical scheme
selected has determined the outcome of virtually every case discussed in Part II,
including all of those during the 1980s. The Chadha and Bowsher rulings fall
into the former group, while Morrison, Mistretta, and Mid-America Pipeline
fall into the latter.24 8
The difficulty arises less from the existence of parallel lines of cases than
from the Court's almost complete failure even to acknowledge its contrasting
methodologies in separation of powers disputes.249 This phenomenon was most
pronounced in Bowsher, which reached its conclusion through rigidly formal
reasoning without so much as citing Commodity Futures Trading Commission
v. Schor, °0 a decision announced the same day which used a much more flexi-
ble approach in rejecting a separation of powers challenge to the assignment of
adjudicatory powers to an agency whose members lacked the salary and tenure
protections of article III judges.25' The opinion in Schor attempted to distin-
guish Bowsher on the basis that Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, but not the CFTC's
organic statute, involved a congressional attempt to aggrandize power at the
expense of another branch. 252 That theme was reiterated in Morrison and Mis-
248. The sole exception to this pattern was Buckley, in which the Court endorsed a relatively pragmatic
approach to separation of powers problems but found that the method for selecting members of the Federal
Election Commission violated the express terms of the appointments clause. See supra notes 97-106 and accompa-
nying text.
249. Judicial acknowledgments of analytical inconsistencies in recent separation of powers jurisprudence ap-
pear primarily in dissenting opinions. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2637 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 865 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Commenta-
tors who take different positions on the proper method for resolving separation of powers disputes express equal
dissatisfaction with the Court's failure to address the analytical inconsistencies in its jurisprudence in this field.
See. e.g., Carter, supra note 199, at 110, 113, 116-17 (advocating a relatively formal approach to separation of
powers problems); Chemerinsky, A Paradox Without a Principle: A Comment on the Burger Court's Jurispru-
dence in Separation of Powers Cases, 60 S. CAL L. Rav. 1083, 1084-85, 1097-101 (1987) (advocating a relatively
pragmatic approach to separation of powers problems).
250. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
251. See supra note 2. An only somewhat less egregious example occurred in Mistretta, where the Court
claimed consistently to have followed a "flexible understanding of separation of powers." Mistretta v. United
States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 659 (1989). That understanding was said to emphasize the danger of interbranch aggran-
dizement. See id. at 658-61.
252. Schor, 478 U.S. at 856-57.
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tretta.2 53 Yet none of these opinions attempted to explain how or why the Court
chose which methodology in any particular case.
Beyond this substantial problem, the aggrandizement-nonaggrandizement
distinction is difficult to apply coherently. Any measure that reallocates author-
ity from one branch to another can be said both to increase the power of the
branch which gains new authority and to diminish the power of the branch
which loses authority that it previously possessed.2 54 All of the cases considered
here involved statutes of this type. For example, in Schor, an administrative
agency was given authority to decide certain common law claims that otherwise
would have been resolved by the courts, thus diminishing the power of the judi-
ciary. In Bowsher, an official supposedly subservient to Congress was given au-
thority to perform executive functions that otherwise would have been under-
taken or directed by the President. Thus, even if Congress did not expressly
usurp judicial power in Schor,2 55 it left the judiciary with a smaller proportion
of federal power than that branch otherwise would have had. By the same to-
ken, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings contained a procedure for avoiding sequestra-
tion under which Congress, by passing a deficit-reduction measure over a presi-
dential veto, could act unilaterally. Hence, even if one accepts the dubious
assumption that the procedure for removing the Comptroller General rendered
that official subservient to the legislative branch, the extent of congressional
aggrandizement might well have been substantially less in Bowsher than in
Schor. Nevertheless, the arrangement in Bowsher was invalidated while that in
Schor was upheld. The arrangements approved in Mid-America Pipeline, Mis-
tretta, and Morrison also involved reallocations of authority comparable to that
rejected in Bowsher.256
The infirmities of the Court's approach have prompted several commenta-
tors to propose alternative reconciliations of these cases. Academic formalists
have suggested that the cases turn on considerations of the constitutional limita-
tions upon how each branch may act. 57 Those adhering to a more functionalist
perspective have tried to harmonize the cases with reference to a more holistic
focus upon the quality and extent of interbranch relationships that vindicate
253. See Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 660; Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2620.
254. See Blumoff, supra note 173, at 1150-51; Krent, supra note 124, at 1288-89; Strauss, supra note 10, at
517. Professor Krent attempts to demonstrate the point algebraically. Krent, supra note 124, at 1288 n.141.
255. In one sense, Congress did arrogate power to itself by conferring the adjudicatory authority in question
upon the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. The CFTC is an "independent agency." Schor, 478 U.S. at
836. Members of the legislative branch often regard independent agencies as creatures of Congress. See Miller,
supra note 165, at 63-64. From this perspective, Schor might indeed involve an attempt at congressional aggran-
dizement of authority at the expense of another branch.
256. The analogous reasoning concerning the cases discussed in the text proceeds as follows. In Mid-America
Pipeline, the executive branch gained the power to impose user fees that otherwise would have rested with Con-
gress. In Mistretta, the judicial branch received the power to determine the permissible range of criminal
sentences, authority that otherwise belonged to Congress. In Morrison, the judicial branch obtained authority over
law enforcement that otherwise would have been exercised by the executive. Even if one characterized the ar-
rangements in the first two cases as congressional giveaways rather than executive or judicial usurpations, the
interbranch balance of power changed as a result of these arrangements. The provision in Gramm-Rudman-Hol-
lings authorizing Congress alone to prevent sequestration from occurring makes it difficult to maintain that the
magnitude of the reallocation of power in Bowsher exceeded that in any of the cases discussed in this footnote.
257. E.g., Krent, supra note 124, at 1256-58, 1273-98.
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underlying structural principles of the Constitution.25" These theories are based
upon considerable intellectual acumen and reflect impressive powers of synthe-
sis. Unfortunately, they are also problematic. For example, some of these theo-
ries do not in fact account for the outcome of all of the recent separation of
powers decisions.259 Moreover, formalism, as Bowsher demonstrates, can attach
enormous legal weight to factors that have little actual significance. By contrast,
functionalism can yield such divergent conclusions that even its adherents cau-
tion against the possibility of "conscious or unconscious manipulation." ' Thus,
this approach may be "more effective as a means of organizing debate than as a
rule for deciding cases."28 1 These difficulties underscore the intractable com-
plexity of the subject.
The unsatisfactory judicial performance and the inadequacies of existing
theories also suggest that Dean Choper might have had a more valuable insight
than he has received credit for when he urged the Supreme Court to refrain
from deciding separation of powers disputes between Congress and the Presi-
dent; such disputes would be resolved through bargaining and accommodation
between the political branches.262 To the extent that his proposal rests upon the
notion that judicial decisions in this field squander limited institutional capital
that should be saved for more urgent individual rights cases, it has received
justifiable criticism.263 On the other hand, this proposal has the virtue of forcing
us to confront the limitations as well as the benefits of judicial review in a field
where principled decisions are difficult to construct and so basic a question as
the proper method of analysis remains unpredictable.
The suggestion of judicial abstention in separation of powers disputes has
elicited concerns that one branch might use its short-term bargaining advantage
to effect permanent and deleterious changes in the relative allocation of pow-
ers.264 These concerns are legitimate but they should not be exaggerated. As
noted in the introduction to this Article, the judiciary has played no role or only
258. E.g., Strauss, supra note 10, at 517-21; Sunstein, supra note 3, at 495-96.
259. Professor Krent, a formalist, and Professor Pierce, a functionalist, both found the Sentencing Commis-
sion unconstitutional under their theories. Krent, supra note 124, at 1311-16; Pierce, supra note 223, at 36. The
Court, on the other hand, upheld the validity of the Sentencing Commission in Mistretta. See supra notes 222-37
and accompanying text. Professor Pierce sought to avoid the implications of his theory by treating the placement
of the Commission in the judicial branch as a slip of the legislative pen. Pierce, supra note 223, at 37.
260. Strauss, supra note 23, at 617. A critic of this approach charges that functionalism serves as "a shield
behind which courts could rationalize their decisions to restructure governmental arrangements, but it does not
provide them with useful criteria as to when and in what circumstances that restructuring is needed." Gifford,
supra note 165, at 479.
The indeterminacy of functionalism is illustrated by the Bowsher case. Justice White demonstrated in detail
that the procedure for removing the Comptroller General, which served as the centerpiece of the Court's opinion,
posed no real threat of congressional usurpation of executive authority. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 770-75
(1986) (White, J., dissenting). Professor Strauss, in turn, criticized Justice White's analysis for failing to look
beyond the removal procedure to "the general framework of relationships among the GAO, Congress, President,
and courts." Strauss, supra note 10, at 520; see id. at 498-99, 519-21.
261. Strauss, supra note 23, at 625 (footnote omitted).
262. J. CHOPER, supra note 22, at 263; see id. at 260-379.
263. Id. at 131-40, 156-70. Dean Choper offered no persuasive evidence that public reaction to rulings up-
holding individual liberties has been affected in any way by the results in separation of powers cases. See Merritt,
supra note 2, at 17 n.101 (collecting criticisms of this aspect of Choper's reasoning).
264. See, e.g., Gifford, supra note 165, at 447-48; Sunstein, supra note 3, at 494-95.
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a marginal one in many important conflicts between Congress and the Presi-
dent, including those involving the Tenure of Office Act, the War Powers Reso-
lution, and Watergate.
These considerations do not necessarily establish the cogency of Dean
Choper's proposal. The original structure of the Federal Election Commission,
which was invalidated in Buckley for violating the appointments clause, shows
that Congress and the President, left to their own devices, might agree to ar-
rangements that contradict the allocation of authority expressly provided in the
text of the Constitution.8 5 That prospect suggests the need for some judicial
role in separation of powers disputes. The experiences with the Tenure of Office
Act, the War Powers Resolution, and Watergate should remind us, however,
that the political branches have their own resources and responsibilities in this
field. That in turn counsels against excessive reliance upon the judiciary as the
ultimate arbiter of legislative-executive controversies. The Supreme Court itself
recently cautioned against gratuitous judicial resolution of such a constitutional
turf battle.2 68 The next two sections examine the reasons for this caution.
B. The Political Branches and Separation of Powers Disputes
Enthusiasts of judicial resolution of separation of powers disputes between
the political branches reason from two essential premises. One is that the politi-
cal branches are unqualified to interpret the Constitution. The other is that in-
terbranch differences pose unacceptable risks to the quality of public policy.
Both of these premises are misleading at best.
The assumption that only the judiciary can resolve constitutional disputes
between Congress and the President has at least two unfortunate consequences.
First, elected officials might refrain from evaluating the constitutionality of
practices or proposals that come before them for consideration. Second, legisla-
tors and chief executives might seek to disguise their opposition to the wisdom
of such practices or proposals by structuring them so as to leave them vulnera-
ble to lawsuits challenging their constitutionality. These avoidance and camou-
flage techniques might insulate politicians from the discomfort associated with
making hard choices, but they also debase the quality of deliberation about
public policy.
These are not purely hypothetical concerns, as situations discussed in Part
II of this Article attest. As to the first, several members of the House Judiciary
Committee voted against the article charging President Nixon with committing
impeachable offenses by defying congressional subpoenas on the ground that
only the courts could determine the validity of the subpoenas.287 As to the sec-
265. See also Olympic Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, No. 90-0482(RCL),
slip op. at 30 n.9 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 1990) ("The President and the Congress, whether alone or together, cannot
decide to circumvent the [appointments clause's requirements.").
266. American Foreign Serv. Ass'n v. Garfinkel, 109 S. Ct. 1693, 1698 (1989). For discussion of the substan-
tive questions at issue in that case, see Quint, Reflections on the Separation of Powers and Judicial Review at the
End of the Reagan Era, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 427, 451-55 (1989).
267. H.R. REP. No. 1305, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 360-61, 485-87 (1974) (minority views); id. at 504-05 (addi-
tional views of Mr. Railsback); id. at 507-08 (additional views of Mr. Dennis); id. at 520-23 (additional views of
Mr. Froehlich in opposition to article III); DEBATE ON ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT: HEARINGS BEFORE THE
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ond, the Democratic leadership of the House of Representatives, which opposed
the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, supported specific provisions that they be-
lieved would make a constitutional challenge to the statute more likely to
succeed.2"8
The abhorrence of interbranch conflict also reflects a very different view of
the process of government than the one embodied in the structure of the Consti-
tution. The framers constructed an elaborate set of checks and balances to
structure the relationship between the political branches. Adherence to these
ground rules was expected to prevent overreaching by one branch and to dis-
courage the enactment of unsound proposals. Excessive reliance upon the judici-
ary to resolve legislative-executive turf battles threatens to undermine the bene-
fits of this scheme. This prospect should be troublesome to all citizens,
regardless of their general views about originalism in constitutional
interpretation.
1. Constitutional Interpretation by the Political Branches
As noted at the outset of this Part, the Supreme Court determined at an
early date that the judicial branch has the duty "to say what the law is."26 9
This statement has served as the predicate for the view that the Court has ulti-
mate, if not exclusive, authority in constitutional interpretation.2 70 For this rea-
son, many observers regard with trepidation any suggestion to treat separation
of powers disputes between Congress and the President as nonjusticiable. Yet
the status of the Supreme Court as sole expositor of the Constitution has not
been universally accepted.
For example, Andrew Jackson refused to regard the ruling in McCulloch v.
Maryland 17 as having settled the constitutionality of the Bank of the United
States. In vetoing a bill to recharter the Bank, Jackson wrote:
The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself be guided by its own
opinion of the Constitution. Each public officer who takes an oath to support the Con-
stitution swears that he will support it as he understands it, and not as it is understood
by others. . . . The authority of the Supreme Court must not, therefore, be permitted
to control the Congress or the Executive when acting in their legislative capacities, but
to have only such influence as the force of their reasoning may deserve.272
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 455-56 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Froehlich); id. at 469-70
(remarks of Rep. Smith); id. at 473, 474 (remarks of Rep. Railsback). For criticism of excessive reliance upon the
judiciary for resolution of this matter, see J. CHOPER, supra note 22, at 307-08; Gunther, supra note 21, at 35-39.
268. See Ellwood, supra note 150, at 564.
269. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see supra text accompanying note 245.
270. E.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). This is
not the only possible interpretation of the language from Marbury, however. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 21, at
34; Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 20.
271. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).




Abraham Lincoln made his opposition to the Dred Scott decision2 73 an im-
portant part.of his unsuccessful campaign for the Senate in 1858 .74 He later
broadened his attack on the "judicial monopoly" theory of constitutional inter-
pretation.175 In his first inaugural address, Lincoln explained:
I do not forget the position assumed by some that constitutional questions are to
be decided by the Supreme Court, nor do I deny that such decisions must be binding
in any case upon the parties to a suit as to the object of that suit, while they are also
entitled to very high respect and consideration in all parallel cases by all other depart-
ments of the Government. . . . At the same time, the candid citizen must confess that
if the policy of the Government upon vital questions affecting the whole people is to be
irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made in
ordinary litigation between parties in personal actions, the people will have ceased to
be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their Government into
the hands of that eminent tribunal.2 7
6
Similar views were expressed both before and after these statements. Thus,
Thomas Jefferson pardoned those convicted under the Sedition Act of 1798277
despite judicial rulings upholding the constitutionality of the statute.2 7 8 More
recently, President Franklin D. Roosevelt vigorously attacked Supreme Court
rulings invalidating important aspects of his legislative agenda.21 9 During the
Watergate investigation, President Nixon implied that he might disregard a Su-
preme Court directive to comply with the special prosecutor's subpoena unless
that ruling was "definitive. ' 28 0 Finally, former Attorney General Edwin Meese
kindled fierce debate with a speech asserting that "constitutional interpretation
273. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
274. For example, during the Lincoln-Douglas Debates, Lincoln accepted the Dred Scott decision as conclu-
sive of the rights of the parties to that case but explained that he would "refus[e] to obey it as a political rule. If I
were in Congress, and a vote should come up on a question whether slavery should be prohibited in a new terri-
tory, in spite of that Dred Scott decision, I would vote that it should." 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM
LINCOLN 495 (R. Basler ed. 1953). In a subsequent debate, Lincoln added that he opposed Dred Scott "as a
political rule which shall be binding on the voter, to vote for nobody who thinks it wrong, which shall be binding
on the members of Congress or the President to favor no measure that does not actually concur with the principles
of that decision." 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra, at 255.
275. This term is used in Mulhern, supra note 23, at 100 & n.5 (citing D. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 89-96 (1966)).
276. 6 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, supra note 272, at 5,
9.
277. Ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801).
278. As Jefferson explained in 1804 in a letter to Abigail Adams, whose husband he had defeated in the
presidential election of 1800 in large measure due to popular revulsion against the Sedition Act:
[N]othing in the Constitution has given [the judges] a right to decide for the executive, more than to the
executive to decide for them. Both magistracies are equally independent in the sphere of action assigned to
them.. . . [The Constitution] meant that its co-ordinate branches should be checks on each other. But the
opinion which gives to the judges the right to decide what laws are constitutional, and what are not, not
only for themselves in their own sphere of action, but for the Legislature and executive also, in their
spheres, would make the judiciary a despotic branch.
4 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 560, 561 (H. Washington ed. 1857).
279. See G. GUNTHER. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 24 (11 th ed. 1985). The judicial hostility to Roosevelt's pro-
gram led to the ill-fated Court-packing plan. See L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES 209-15 (1988);
Leuchtenburg, The Case of the Contentious Commissioner: Humphreys' [sic] Executor v. U.S., in FREEDOM AND
REFORM 276, 310-11 (H. Hyman & L. Levy eds. 1967).
280. E. DREW, supra note 80, at 5, 45, 283, 304-05, 328. One of President Nixon's advisors was widely
quoted as saying: "We're leading ourselves into believing the Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter of all disputes,
and I don't believe it. I think there are times when the President of the United States would be right in not
obeying a decision of the Supreme Court." Id. at 21.
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is not the business of the Court only, but also properly the business of .all
branches of government." 28'
Even if one rejects the nonjusticiability approach and supports highly def-
erential judicial review in separation of powers disputes between Congress and
the President, other powerful considerations support an independent role for the
political branches in constitutional interpretation. At the most basic level,
elected officials must take an oath to uphold the Constitution.' Faithfulness to
their oath necessarily requires members of Congress and the President to con-
sider the constitutionality of proposed policies as an important aspect of per-
forming their duties.283
Beyond the implications of the oath requirement, the Constitution imposes
affirmative obligations upon elected officials. Several provisions specifically pro-
scribe certain kinds of legislation,'2 4 and a number expressly authorize the pas-
sage of implementing statutes.' Moreover, the Supreme Court itself has held
that Congress is not strictly bound by judicial interpretations of equal protec-
tion in enforcing the fourteenth amendment through legislation.28 6 Accordingly,
the political branches cannot escape the necessity of assessing the constitution-
ality of at least some policy proposals.
In addition, the judiciary cannot resolve every constitutional issue. First,
article III restricts the jurisdiction of the federal courts to cases and controver-
sies. 217 Hence, the judicial branch cannot provide advisory opinions to Congress
or the President on the constitutionality of a proposed bill or program.' 8  Sec-
281. Meese, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL L. REV. 979, 985 (1987). For a compilation of popular
and academic responses to this speech, see Perspectives on the Authoritativeness of Supreme Court Decisions, 61
TUL L. REV. 977-1095 (1987).
In an earlier and less publicized episode, Mr. Meese suggested that the executive branch might not deem
itself bound by an adverse judicial ruling in a separation of powers dispute. Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 787 F.2d 875, 889-90 (3d Cir.), on reh'g, 809 F.2d 979, 991-92 n.8 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed, 109 S.
Ct. 297 (1988); see Waas & Toobin, Meese's Power Grab, NEW REPUBLIC, May 19, 1986, at 15.
282. The presidential oath is prescribed in U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7. The requirement that members of
Congress (as well as federal judges and all state officials) pledge to "support this Constitution" appears in id. art.
VI, cl. 3.
283. L. FISHER, supra note 279, at 233-34; Bessette & Tulis, supra note 65, at 11; Brest, The Conscientious
Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585, 587 (1975); Ross, Legislative Enforce-
ment of Equal Protection, 72 MINN. L. REV. 311, 313-14 (1987).
284. E.g., U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9 (prohibiting, inter alia, bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, expenditures
not authorized by a duly enacted appropriations statute, and titles of nobility; and limiting the grounds for sus-
pending habeas corpus); id. amend. I (prohibiting laws that establish religion or abridge freedom of religion,
speech, press, and assembly); id. amend. V (prohibiting, inter alia, double jeopardy; self-incrimination; deprivation
of life, liberty, or property without due process; and uncompensated takings of private property).
285. E.g., id. amend. XIII, § 2; id. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV, § 2; id. amend. XIX, § 2; id. amend.
XXIII, § 2; id. amend. XXIV, § 2; id. amend. XXVI, § 2.
286. The leading case is Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). For discussion of the role of the
legislative branch in interpreting the fourteenth amendment, see L. TRiBE, supra note 206, § 5-14, at 334-50;
Burt, Miranda and Title 11: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 Sup. CT. REv. 81; Cohen, Congressional Power to
Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REv. 603 (1975); Ross, supra note 283.
287. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
288. Some state courts do have the authority to issue advisory opinions. A prominent example is Massachu-
setts, where Governor Michael Dukakis's decision to veto a mandatory flag-salute law in response to the advice of
his state's highest court, Opinions of the Justices to the Governor, 372 Mass. 874, 363 N.E.2d 251 (1977), became
an unusually salient issue in the 1988 presidential campaign. See generally J. GERMOND & J. WITCOVER, WHOSE
BROAD STRIPES AND BRIGHT STARS? 7-8, 160, 359, 460 (1989); Drew, Letter from Washington, NEW YORKER,
Oct. 10, 1988, at 96, 96-97.
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ond, only those with standing to sue may challenge the constitutionality of gov-
ernment policies. If too many persons are affected by a particular policy, no
private party will have standing to litigate a generalized grievance." 9 Even if
that obstacle is surmounted, other barriers to standing might well prevent the
litigation of an appreciable number of separation of powers disputes. °90 Third,
the Court has various devices to avoid deciding the merits of cases over which it
does have jurisdiction.291 In each of these situations, the absence of judicial res-
olution of the merits effectively requires members of Congress and the President
to determine the constitutionality of governmental activities for themselves.
Finally, as a practical matter, Congress and the President already interpret
the Constitution. That document fixes important political understandings that
289. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464 (1982); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
The standing of members of Congress to litigate the validity of governmental activities remains unsettled. The
Supreme Court expressly declined to address that issue in Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986), and
avoided the merits in a subsequent case in which the question was squarely presented, Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S.
361 (1987). Most of the jurisprudence on this question has arisen in the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, which has recognized congressional standing in some cases. See, e.g., Barnes v.
Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacated as moot sub noma. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987); Kennedy
v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The concept of congressional standing has been controversial even in
that court. See, e.g., Barnes, 759 F.2d at 43-56 (Bork, J., dissenting); Moore v. United States House of Represent-
atives, 733 F.2d 946, 957-61 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., concurring), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985).
At the same time, the D.C. Circuit has limited congressional access to judicial relief under a doctrine known
as "equitable discretion," which results in the dismissal of some cases in which the congressional plaintiff is found
to have standing and where no other devices for avoiding the merits are available. See, e.g., Melcher v. Federal
Open Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2034 (1988); Vander Jagt v. O'Neill,
699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983); Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 656
F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981); see generally McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The
New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. REV. 241 (1981) (proposing equitable discretion doctrine as an avoidance device). This
doctrine also has drawn withering criticism, see Barnes, 759 F.2d at 59-61 (Bork, J., dissenting); Moore, 733 F.2d
at 961-64 (Scalia, J., concurring), and some members of the court who previously had applied the doctrine have
expressed serious misgivings about it, see Humphrey v. Baker, 848 F.2d 211, 214 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Humphrey v. Brady, 109 S. Ct. 491 (1988); Melcher, 836 F.2d at 565 n.4; id. at 565 (Edwards, J., concur-
ring). For a comprehensive discussion, see Note, Equitable Discretion to Dismiss Congressional-PlaintiffSuits: A
Reassessment, 40 CASE W. Rss. L REV. - (1990).
290. In order to establish standing, a plaintiff must satisfy a three-prong test of injury in fact, causation, and
redressability. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472. The jurisprudence of
standing has been notably erratic, but recent decisions have adopted a markedly restrictive approach. See, e.g.,
Allen, 468 U.S. 737; City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). The commentary on this subject is voluminous.
See, e.g., Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article I11: Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy" Requirement,
93 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1979); Nichol, Injury and the Disintegration of Article III, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1915
(1986); Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432 (1988); Tushnet, The
Sociology of Article Ill: A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1698 (1980).
291. Among these avoidance techniques are the political question and ripeness doctrines. The former holds
that the issue in dispute is inappropriate for judicial resolution at any time, whereas the latter views the contro-
versy as prematurely presented to the courts.
The political question doctrine has been distinctly out of favor with the Supreme Court in recent decades.
See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 121-27 (1986); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 940-43 (1983); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 692-97 (1974); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.
486. 518-49 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). But see Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002-
06 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1973). Lower
courts have made greater use of the doctrine during this period. See Mulhern, supra note 23, at 106-08 nn.25-31
(collecting cases).
The leading case on ripeness is Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). See generally Nichol, Ripe-
ness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 153 (1987).
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typically go unremarked because of their broad acceptance. For example, no
controversy exists over the eligibility standards or the duration of terms for fed-
eral elected officials. Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and Ronald Reagan did not
seek third terms because all concerned understood that the twenty-second
amendment precluded them from doing so; Edward Kennedy did not seek his
brother John's Senate seat in 1961 because article I made clear that a twenty-
nine-year-old, no matter how prominent or well connected, could not hold the
position. Similarly, despite the controversy over the legislative veto, no one ques-
tions that bills must satisfy the bicameralism and presentation requirements to
become laws, or that the Senate must confirm ambassadors, federal judges, and
other officers of the United States.29 2 Indeed, during Watergate members of
Congress from both parties believed that President Nixon's defiance of a Su-
preme Court ruling in the litigation over the White House tape recordings
would both justify and assure his impeachment and removal from office, a con-
clusion for which no judicial precedent existed. 293 Thus, the question is not
whether the political branches will interpret the Constitution but under what
circumstances they will do so.
2. The Benefits of Interbranch Constitutional Debate
The preceding discussion demonstrated that legislative and executive evalu-
ation of the constitutional issues raised in separation of powers disputes between
Congress and the President is appropriate. This section further suggests that
such consideration is desirable. To be sure, independent constitutional interpre-
tation by nonjudicial officials holds out the prospect of disagreement between
the political branches on fundamental issues. Although many modern commen-
tators view interbranch conflict with distaste,294 the Constitution was designed
to facilitate debate among elected officials on important public questions. This
debate might lead to stalemate, but it also could stimulate more thoughtful pub-
lic policy. This prospect suggests that Congress and the President should be
discouraged from relying too much upon the judiciary as arbiter of separation
of powers disputes and encouraged to reach workable accommodations that do
not contravene the constitutional text.
As noted earlier, the Constitution recognized the possibility that one
branch would seek to encroach upon the power of another, thereby jeopardizing
the core value of freedom upon which the new government rested. 95 To mini-
mize this possibility, each branch was given sufficient power and incentives to
resist attempted usurpations. Because the framers feared legislative aggrandize-
ment,296 they made Congress bicameral and gave the President a qualified veto.
292. See Bessette & Tulis, supra note 65, at 9-10; Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL L. REv. 399, 414 (1985).
The only exception to the statement in text concerns the President's power to make recess appointments when the
Senate is not in session. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
293. See E. DREW, supra note 80, at 41, 43, 51, 283, 292; Bessette & Tulis, supra note 65, at 9.
294. N. POLSBY, CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENCY 202 (4th ed. 1986). Professor Polsby is not one of those
commentators. See id.
295. See supra notes 64-77 and accompanying text.
296. Perhaps the most famous expression of this concern is Madison's observation that "[i]n republican gov-
ernment, the legislative authority necessarily predominates." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 68, at 322.
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At the same time, the unfortunate experience under the British made all con-
cerned acutely aware of the dangers of unchecked executive power, which was
"carefully limited" in article II.297 Significantly, however, the Constitution did
not explicitly define the respective powers of each branch, and its supporters
discounted the value of "parchment barriers" against overreaching. 08 Despite
the availability of judicial review,29  Congress and the President were expected
to rely primarily upon their own political self-defense mechanisms when inter-
branch disputes arose.
In short, the framers did not contemplate an active judicial role in separa-
tion of powers disputes. This crude originalism cannot end the discussion, how-
ever. After all, the framers also created a system of limited government. Be-
cause the Constitution embodied liberty as one of its core values, a faithful
adherent to the founding design might argue that the courts should police the
vision of the framers by rigorously enforcing the separation of powers. This ar-
gument takes on added force in light of the vastly increased scale of federal
activities compared with the role of the central government envisioned in the
last decades of the eighteenth century.
Two responses to this claim are available. First, the Supreme Court in re-
cent years has tried to give effect to the founding design. As Part II sought to
demonstrate, the results of this enterprise have been unsatisfactory. An original-
ist might rejoin that these difficulties have arisen from the Court's failure to
apply a strict separation principle with sufficient consistency. That point leads
directly into the second response to the originalist position: The framers lacked
a detailed vision of the institutional implications of the separation of powers
doctrine and did not contemplate a regime of rigid formality in this field.300 The
absence of such a vision might help to explain the difficulties of the recent judi-
cial opinions on this subject. Because the Constitution does not yield conclusive
answers to these questions and because Congress and the President have both
the resources and the incentive to defend their positions, disputes of this kind
are appropriately addressed primarily in the political arena, with judicial re-
course serving only as a last resort.
At bottom, these disputes involve questions about the role of government in
American life. In general, those who advocate strict maintenance of interbranch
boundaries believe in a comparatively limited federal role. Although the Su-
preme Court has dealt with the subject only obliquely,30' several commentators
Madison also complained that "ft]he legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and
drawing all power into its impetuous vortex." THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 309 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed.
1961).
297. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 296, at 309. See also D. EPSTEIN, supra note 69, at 132.
298. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 296, at 308-09.
299. The question of the legitimacy and proper scope of judicial review is beyond the scope of this Article.
See supra note 24. Suffice it to say that supporters of the Constitution argued that the courts would have the
power to invalidate legislation. E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466-69 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
300. W. GWYN, supra note 46, at 128; Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and
Practices, 30 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 211, 212, 224, 239-42, 260-61 (1989); Shane, supra note 209, at 616-17.
301. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986) (separation of powers "provide[s] avenues for the
operation of checks on the exercise of governmental power"); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (separation of powers operates to "define and limit the exercise of. . . federal powers").
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have recognized the political implications of these conflicts. Rigid demarcation
between the executive and legislative branches, according to this view, would
make it more difficult for the federal government to act. A strong delegation
doctrine would force Congress to make hard policy choices about contentious
subjects; the more specific the statute must be, the greater the possibility that
opponents could defeat it. The absence of the legislative veto would discourage
Congress from authorizing agencies to promulgate regulations that could be
overturned only through the regular legislative process with all its complexities
and pitfalls. And giving the President unfettered removal authority and absolute
control over all officials exercising executive power would make Congress less
willing to permit agencies from which the legislature would be effectively insu-
lated.30 2 The political compromises leading to the creation of the Interstate
Commerce Commission and the Federal Trade Commisssion suggest that this
view is not entirely implausible.303
Whether or not rigorous adherence to separation of powers principles
would reduce the federal role, 04 powerful legal arguments exist for a more flex-
ible constitutional analysis in this field. Among them are the flexibility inherent
in a Constitution which does not rigidly define the authority of the legislative
and executive branches, the apparent pragmatism of the framers in addressing
problems of administration, the wide (though not unlimited) latitude afforded to
Congress under the "necessary and proper" clause to structure the government,
and the twentieth-century breakdown of whatever earlier consensus had existed
in favor of strictly limited government. 05 Moreover, wide public support re-
mains for an enlarged federal role, as the difficulty of reducing the budget defi-
302. See, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 16-17 (1985); Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 146, at 63-64;
Epstein, Self-Interest and the Constitution, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 153, 156 (1987); Gellhorn, Returning to First
Principles, 36 Am. U.L. REV. 345, 349 (1987).
303. See R. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 177-87 (1941) (ICC); S.
SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE 138-50 (1982) (FTC).
304. It is difficult to assess the accuracy of this hypothesis. In Chadha, the Supreme Court held that statutes
containing unconstitutional legislative vetoes could remain in force if the objectionable veto provisions were severa-
ble. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 931-32. The Court endorsed a severability criterion that would uphold a partially uncon-
stitutional statute "[u]nless it is evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are
within its power, independently of that which is not." Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210,
234 (1932).
Applying that standard reveals the difficulty of predicting what Congress would do under a stricter separation
of powers regime. The Chadha majority found the legislative veto provision severable from the remainder of the
Immigration and Nationality Act. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 932-35. Justice Rehnquist, after examining the identical
historical record, found that it was not. Id. at 1013-16 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Similarly, the Court summarily
affirmed a finding of severability in one of Chadha's companion cases despite strong indications that the measure
in question would not have been enacted without the veto. See Consumer Energy Council v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425,
440-45 (D.C. Cir. 1982), affid mem. sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 463
U.S. 1216 (1983). The evidence to the contrary included protracted congressional consideration of the statute,
which passed the House by only one vote after its proponents emphasized the availability of legislative vetoes of
objectionable agency rules. See Miller, supra note 165, at 89 n.175; Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule of
Law: Some Comments on Rubin, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 427, 447 (1989).
305. Perhaps the leading academic advocates of this perspective have been Professors Strauss and Sunstein.
See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 23; Sunstein, supra note 3. On the "necessary and proper" clause, see Van Alstyne,
The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment
on the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping Clause, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1976, at 102.
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cit during the 1980s attests.306 In these circumstances, a sustained effort to in-
validate government programs on separation of powers grounds could threaten a
political crisis comparable to the one that arose from the Supreme Court's over-
turning many of the early New Deal reforms.307
The optimum solution to this conflict is for partisans of the competing ap-
proaches to argue over their political disagreements in political settings. This
solution has several advantages over reliance upon the courts. First, the difficul-
ties of producing consistent, principled answers to these problems suggest that
the concept of separation of powers provides less a rule of decision than a heu-
ristic concept for structuring analysis.3"8
Second, interbranch negotiation rather than judicial determination ac-
knowledges the political contingencies involved in many separation of powers
disputes. As noted above, supporters of a strong doctrine in this field tradition-
ally have also endorsed limited government. For that reason, advocates of a
more activist state generally have denigrated the separation principle as an
anachronism at best and an obstacle to essential reforms at worst.30 9 This pat-
tern has not always existed, however. For example, in the 1970s the principal
exponents of legislative authority as a means of recapturing the proper inter-
branch allocation of power supported a greater federal role; the defenders of
expansive presidential prerogatives favored a smaller central government. 310
Moreover, the leading separation of powers cases in recent years have been ad-
vanced not by advocates of smaller government but by champions of a more
aggessive federal role. The challenges to the constitutionality of the legislative
veto in Chadha, the deficit-reduction mechanism of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
in Bowsher, and the Sentencing Commission in Mistretta were brought by ad-
vocates of more vigorous government regulation. These exponents of a more
activist state believe that strict adherence to separation of powers principles will
reduce the influence of industry, trade, and other economic special interests and
thereby facilitate the development and implementation of effective programs to
306. See R. EISNER, How REAL IS THE FEDERAL DEFICIT? 160-61 (1986); D. STOCKMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF
POLITICS 8-9, 376-77, 390-92 (1986).
307. Political prediction is a notoriously risky affair. Nevertheless, the intense opposition to the failed Su-
preme Court nomination of Robert Bork, which reflected concern over the threat of significant changes in consti-
tutional law, suggests that a separation of powers jurisprudence that invalidated many environmental, health, and
safety programs would stimulate widespread controversy. Even Professor Epstein, a leading academic exponent of
limited government, recognizes the difficulty of wholesale judicial reversal of objectionable legal doctrine. R.
EPSTEIN, supra note 302, at 306-07, 329; Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV.
1387, 1387, 1454-55 (1987).
308. See Kurland, The Rise and Fall of the "Doctrine" of Separation of Powers, 85 MICH. L. REV. 592, 602
(1986).
309. For modern expositions of this view, see, e.g., J. BURNS, THE DEADLOCK OF DEMOCRACY (1963); Cutler,
To Form a Government, 59 FOREIGN AFF. 126 (1980). Similar conceptions undergirded the Progressive critique of
American politics developed most conspicuously by Woodrow Wilson. See J. TuLis, supra note 66, at 119-24; see
also Mahoney, A Newer Science of Politics: The Federalist and American Political Science in the Progressive
Era, in SAVING THE REVOLUTION, supra note 64, at 250, 251-61.
310. Several statutes passed during this period exemplify Congress' efforts to reassert its powers. See, e.g.,
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. (1988)); War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555
(1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982)). For a skeptical view of these efforts, see E. DREW, supra
note 80, at 9-10.
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protect public health and safety.31' Thus, committed advocates of contrasting
substantive political visions might find it advantageous not to have separation of
powers disputes resolved by the courts because short-term judicial victories for
one side might have sobering longer-term implications when the other side con-
trols the government. a1'
Third, and most significantly, reliance upon the political process to resolve
most separation of powers disputes recognizes that an effective government re-
quires a degree of interbranch comity that is inconsistent with frequent resort to
the judicial process. Despite the importance of "uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open" debate on public issues,"' our system rests upon unexpressed understand-
ings and an uncodified but shared sense of limits." 4 Understandings are unex-
pressed and the sense of limits is shared but uncodified because participants in
the political process recognize the need to avoid open warfare and because both
structural and institutional factors dampen the inevitable conflicts that do
arise. 315
Judicial opinions, on the other hand, raise the stakes of any particular con-
flict by clearly identifying winners and losers through formal explanations that
presumably will control other analytically related disputes." 6 The prospect of
litigation creates incentives to assert maximum positions for short-term advan-
tage in court and to characterize opposing views as illegitimate." 7 In situations
where the Constitution provides no determinative answer, Congress and the
President would do better to seek to resolve their separation of powers disputes
by negotiating them in good faith than to depend upon the judiciary as other
than a last resort. Negotiated resolutions of specific disagreements can decide
smaller questions in ways that create a foundation for similarly informal ar-
rangements of future interbranch differences while recognizing the contrasting
interests of the governmental institutions involved." 8
311. All three of these cases were argued in the Supreme Court by Alan Morrison, director of litigation at
Public Citizen, Inc., a public-interest organization founded by Ralph Nader that favors more vigorous government
regulation. Morrison agreed to take these cases for the reasons described in the text. B. CRAIG, supra note 112, at
61-65; Elliott, supra note 159, at 319 n.12.
312. For example, a conservative journalist recently warned that admirers of Ronald Reagan who advocate a
strong presidency as a bulwark against intrusive actions by an unsympathetic Congress should consider the impli-
cations of giving similar powers to a liberal chief executive when political fashions change. Francis, Imperial
Conservatives?, NAT'L REV., Aug. 4, 1989, at 37.
313. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
314. See, e.g., E. DREW, supra note 80, at 9; Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L
REV. 371, 391 (1976). This is a lesson that some notably unsuccessful recent Presidents, especially Richard Nixon
and Jimmy Carter, failed to learn. N. POLSBY, supra note 294, at 45, 49-50, 66.
315. See N. POLSBY, supra note 294, at 206-09.
316. R. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES 18-22 (1989). Professor Nagel probably would not agree with
the suggestion that separation of powers disputes are generally better handled outside the judicial system. See
Nagel, A Comment on the Rule of Law Model of Separation of Powers, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 355, 360-62
(1989) (criticizing functionalist arguments supporting the result in Morrison); but see id. at 363-64 (warning
against the dangers of "[d]octrinaire enforcement of the theory of separation of powers").
317. R. NAGEL, supra note 316, at 20-21; Shane, Legal Disagreement in a Government of Laws: The Case of
Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, 71 MINN. L. REV. 461, 464-65, 492, 501-14 (1987).
318. The procedural details for accomplishing interbranch negotiations are beyond the scope of this article.
For a suggested framework for handling executive privilege disputes, see Shane, supra note 317, at 516-40.
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Some might object to this approach on the ground that it will undermine
the rule of law by facilitating interbranch power grabs. Yet our political history
teaches that "an excessive force in one direction is apt to produce a correspond-
ing counterforce." 15 9 This is the lesson not only of the controversies over the
Tenure of Office Act and of Watergate, but also of most of our political history.
Overreaching by one of the political branches typically begets reassertion by the
other.320 To be sure, the relative powers of Congress and the President would
change over time if interbranch disputes were generally negotiated rather than
litigated,321 but the relative powers of the political branches have changed dra-
matically anyway.322 In any event, the argument here does not preclude judicial
resolution of separation of powers issues. Instead, it simply urges Congress and
the President to avoid excessive reliance upon that practice. Courts would still
be available to address properly presented legal claims. The point is only that
most such claims are more appropriately addressed in nonjudicial forums.323
319. Freund, The Supreme Court, 1973 Term-Foreword: On Presidential Privilege, 88 HARV. L. REV. 13,
20 (1974).
320. Diver, Presidential Powers, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 519, 532 (1987); Karl, supra note 110, at 34; Pierce,
Political Accountability and Delegated Power: A Response to Professor Lowi, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 391, 405-06
(1987).
Indeed, the reassertion itself may represent an alternative form of overreaching in the absence of the neces-
sary interbranch comity. For example, Congress became enamored of the legislative veto as a means for control-
ling substantive administrative rules during the Nixon administration, when the relationship between the legisla-
tive and executive branches was especially bitter. Approximately 80% of the more than 200 bills containing
legislative vetoes enacted between 1950 and 1976 were approved from 1970 onward. N. POLSBY, supra note 294,
at 237 n.122 (citing Cooper & Hurley, The Legislative Veto: A Policy Analysis, 10 CONG. & PRESIDENCY 1
(1983)).
321. See R. NAGEL, supra note 316, at 22.
322. In both relative and absolute terms, the presidency has become considerably stronger than Congress.
Except for foreign affairs, early Presidents played a comparatively minor role. Andrew Jackson seized the initia-
tive from Congress on a number of fronts, generating intense controversy in the process. Jackson was followed by
a series of weaker chief executives until Abraham Lincoln, who held office during a period of unprecedented
national crisis. See generally E. HARGROVE & M. NELSON, PRESIDENTS, POLITICS, AND POLICY 45-50 (1984).
Since the Civil War, the federal government has undertaken vastly increased responsibilities. In the latter
part of the nineteenth century, Congress predominated, often with presidential acquiescence. The twentieth cen-
tury has seen cycles of more active executive leadership interspersed with periods of congressional ascendancy. Id.
at 49-50; B. KARL, EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION AND REFORM IN THE NEW DEAL 30-31, 34-35, 166-68, 186-87
(1963); H. LASKI, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 127-37 (1940). The balance began moving toward the White
House under Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, with a less activist interlude between them under William
Howard Taft. Wilson was succeeded by weaker Presidents until Franklin D. Roosevelt seemingly altered the
congressional-executive balance permanently. The perceived excesses of subsequent Presidents, particularly Lyn-
don Johnson and Richard Nixon, in turn gave rise to fears of executive domination. Indeed, some of the most
vocal critics of executive power had been celebrants of the rise of the presidency at the expense of Congress in
earlier years. See, e.g., A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973). Th difficulties of Gerald Ford
and Jimmy Carter, by contrast, prompted many observers to wonder whether the institution of the presidency had
become too weak, a concern that has been much subordinated by the apparent success of Ronald Reagan. See,
e.g., Greenstein, The Need for an Early Appraisal of the Reagan Presidency, in THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY 1, 6-7
(F. Greenstein ed. 1983); Reeves, The Ideological Election, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1984, § 6 (Magazine), at 26,
29. But see Lowi, Ronald Reagan-Revolutionary?, in THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY AND THE GOVERNING OF
AMERICA 29, 47-48 (L. Salamon & M. Lund eds. 1985).
323. An episode of a different sort illustrates the point. The apparent success of negative campaigning by
independent organizations such as the National Conservative Political Action Committee in 1980 enabled some
targets of NCPAC attacks in 1982 to generate sympathy and made it easier for them to raise campaign funds. A
striking example occurred in Maryland, where the Republican challenger to Senator Paul Sarbanes pleaded un-
successfully with the organization to tone down its advertisements or withdraw from the state altogether. See
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C. Bringing Political Judgment Back In: The Need for Wisdom
Forbearing to litigate interbranch separation of powers disputes offers one
final benefit. Because participants in such disputes would have less incentive to
jockey for advantage in judicial proceedings, they might devote more attention
to the wisdom of controversial proposals. Courts determine only the constitu-
tionality, not the wisdom, of a statute or practice.3 24 Professor Nathanson re-
minded us that "the debate over . . . desirability . . . need not be conducted
entirely on the constitutional level, and that a Supreme Court decision rejecting
a constitutional challenge should not be interpreted as a vindication of...
practical value . . . ,,a25 This reminder has particular relevance to the policy
innovations that gave rise to the recent separation of powers jurisprudence.
Some of those innovations, whatever their constitutionality, were of dubious wis-
dom. That mundane point was frequently overlooked in the loftier legal and
academic debate over Chadha, Bowsher, Morrison, and other Supreme Court
cases.
Consider the legislative veto. That device quite properly has been criticized
for skewing the administrative process in subtle but potentially important ways.
In particular, the legislative veto tended to bias the process against regulation
by giving members of Congress the opportunity to reject a specific proposal
without having to weigh alternatives, confer advantages upon economically pow-
erful trade and industry groups which have the resources to oppose regulations
both at the agency and on Capitol Hill, encourage broad delegations, and in-
crease the risk of political impasse between regulators and legislators."2 6
Whatever the constitutionality of the veto, these characteristics provide poten-
tially powerful arguments against the desirability of the device as a means of
controlling administrative discretion. Those arguments do not depend upon hy-
pothetical comparisons with other congressional devices for preventing agency
overreaching; they address the wisdom of the legislative veto on its own
terms.3 27 Moreover, if the legislative veto were applied as broadly as many of its
Leatherberry, Rethinking Regulation of Independent Expenditures by PACs, 35 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 13, 27 &
nn.81-82 (1984).
This episode suggests that the adverse impact of a Supreme Court ruling upholding the constitutionality of
the so-called regulatory legislative veto might well have been less than veto opponents feared. The principal benefi-
ciaries of such a ruling would have been politically well-connected interests such as used-car dealers and funeral
directors, whose generous campaign contributions were widely noted. Such groups probably would have overplayed
their hand before long, thereby generating a political backlash that would have made it more difficult for those
groups to prevail in Congress because many legislators would fear criticism for having been "bought" by special
interest groups.
324. See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 712 (1986); Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 973 (1982);
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488
(1955); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 550-51 (1949); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 447-48 (1934).
325. Nathanson, supra note 110, at 1091. Professor Nathanson made this point in a discussion of the legisla-
tive veto, but his suggestion apparently was too subtle for some readers who characterized his reluctance to invali-
date the veto as showing his "generally favorable" disposition toward its desirability. See Immigration & Natural-
ization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 976 n.12 (1983) (White, J., dissenting); Martin, supra note 134, at 255
n.5.
326. See supra text accompanying notes 110 & 134.
327. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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enthusiasts proposed, Congress could quickly find itself overwhelmed by the
task of reviewing agency regulations.32 Even if it is constitutional, then, the
legislative veto is a bad idea that would create more problems than it would
solve.
Similarly, the abstract debate over the Comptroller General's alleged sub-
servience to Congress diverted attention from the fundamental flaws of Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings as a means for reducing the budget deficit. At the most basic
level, the statute rests upon controversial economic assumptions concerning the
adverse effects of deficits.329 Even accepting the underlying premise that current
budgetary shortfalls have reached unacceptable levels, however, Gramm-Rud-
man-Hollings had numerous defects. First, it contained no sanction if the fed-
eral government actually exceeded the annual deficit limit; the statutory targets
applied only to the projected deficit at the beginning of the fiscal year.3t More
significantly, nothing in the law required that the projected deficit be based
upon realistic economic assumptions or that the political branches avoid the
most blatant accounting gimmicks to avoid triggering the sequestration process.
Consequently, the measures taken to reduce the projected deficit frequently
have strained credulity.331 These defects do not necessarily mean that Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings should have been defeated. Nevertheless, these were the real
problems presented by the statute. The role of the Comptroller General was
peripheral.
Finally, the litigation over the constitutionality of the independent counsel
obscured other troublesome questions about the Ethics in Government Act.
First, by requiring an outside investigation of credible allegations of criminal
wrongdoing against high-level executive officials, the statute presumes that the
328. This daunting prospect played an important role in the defeat of bills that would have created so-called
generic legislative vetoes in the years before the Chadha decision. See B. CRAIG, supra note 112, at 49-50, 56-57.
At the same time, neither the Supreme Court's invalidation of the legislative veto in Chadha nor the general
undesirability of the device has prevented its reappearance in a large number of statutes since 1983. Congress has
enacted more than 100 such provisions despite the seemingly unambiguous judicial condemnation of the practice.
Almost all of these new vetoes appear in appropriations bills and give the power to disapprove proposed expendi-
tures to committees or even to subcommittees. Despite presidential objections, the executive branch has acquiesced
in these arrangements because they afford useful flexibility. See L. FISHER. THE POuITICS OF SHARED POWER 102-
03 (2d ed. 1987); Strauss, supra note 304, at 446 n.63.
329. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings rests upon the notion that deficits are unmitigated evils. Many economists,
however, reject this concept and believe that a single-minded campaign to reduce the deficit can do more harm
than good. See, e.g., R. EISNER, supra note 306, at 161-64; Stith, supra note 150, at 638-39.
330. Kuttner, The Fudge Factor, NEW REPUBLIC, June 19, 1989, at 22, 23. Moreover, both the original
version of the statute and the 1987 revisions passed in response to the ruling in Bowsher specifically limited the
size of any sequestration order for the fiscal year during which these measures were enacted, even though these
provisions prevented attainment of the deficit target for those years. See Stith, supra note 150, at 629-30.
331. Among the devices that have been used to bring projected deficits into compliance with Gramm-Rud-
man-Hollings are postponing payments from the last day of one fiscal year to the first day of the following one,
assuming higher rates of economic growth and lower rates of inflation than predicted by reputable private fore-
casters, selling off government assets, and removing items likely to contribute substantially to the deficit (such as
the savings-and-loan relief program and, in the current year, the Postal Service) "off budget" in whole or part. B.
FRIEDMAN, DAY OF RECKONING 278-79 (1988); Domenici, The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Budget Process: An
Act in Legislative Futility?, 25 HARV. J. ON LEOls. 537, 540 (1988); Downey, The Futility of Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGoS. 545, 548-49 (1988); Drew, Letter from Washington, NEW YORKER, May 15,
1989, at 87, 91; Friedman, A Deficit of Courage, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, June 1, 1989, at 23, 26; Kuttner, supra note
330, at 22-23.
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professional staff of the Department of Justice is incapable of dispassionately
handling sensitive cases. To be sure, the Department performed inadequately
during Watergate. Ironically, the Ethics Act, which was passed to restore public
confidence in government, subtly undermines that goal by the presumption of
governmental incompetence upon which the independent counsel provision rests.
Perhaps this unintended consequence does not outweigh the benefits of avoiding
perceived conflicts of interest, but that question apparently got lost in the con-
stitutional rhetoric. Second, despite its name, the Ethics Act emphasizes crimi-
nality rather than ethical impropriety. Accordingly, targets of investigations by
independent counsel routinely proclaim themselves vindicated if the counsel
does not seek an indictment.3 32 Surely we should expect public officials to aspire
to higher standards of conduct than "Never Been Indicted. '' 33
IV. CONCLUSION
The Constitution is more than "what the judges say it is. ' ' 3" 4 That docu-
ment provides the framework for our government and our politics. It is, in short,
an important part of our culture as well as of our law.335 Accordingly, the Con-
stitution derives its meaning not only from judicial interpretation but also from
shared understandings that emerge from governance and politics. This fact sug-
gests that not every dispute over the appropriate division of authority between
Congress and the President requires judicial resolution. Instead, the political
branches themselves have resources and obligations to develop their own views
and to fashion accommodations of their sometimes conflicting interests. More-
over, just as the Constitution might not apply in a determinative way to particu-
lar interbranch disputes, sometimes the wisdom of a proposed statute or policy
is more important than its constitutionality. Both politicians and citizens too
often forget this mundane point.
This view of the separation of powers assumes a minimum level of inter-
branch comity. The present political situation affords few grounds for optimism.
For most of the past generation, we have had a divided federal government,
with one party controlling the legislative branch and the other controlling the
executive. In addition, each branch has developed sophisticated legal staffs
which seek vigilantly to safeguard their constitutional prerogatives.336 For these
and other reasons, powerful incentives exist for conflict rather than coopera-
332. Carter, supra note 199, at 139. Not only the targets of such investigations adopt this rhetorical posture;
Presidents do, too. See The President's News Conference, 24 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DoCS. 255, 258 (1988) ("no
attention is paid to the fact of how many [targets of independent counsel investigations], when it actually came to
trial, [were] found totally to be innocent").
333. C. TRILLIN, The Motto-Maker's Art, in IF You CAN'T SAY SOMETHING NICE 11, 11-12, 14 (1987). See
also Carter, supra note 199, at 139.
334. L. FISHER, supra note 279, at 245 (quoting ADDRESSES AND PAPERS OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 139
(1908)).
335. See S. LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988).
336. See Miller, supra note 79, at 412-26.
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tion. 3 7 Even when those obstacles are overcome, the quality of interbranch con-
stitutional debate might disappoint aficionados of judicial interpretation. 38
Regardless of the current outlook, however, the approach suggested here
comports with the constitutional design for a government characterized by both
liberty and efficiency. The unlikelihood that this approach will be adopted sim-
ply proves that the Constitution affords the necessary, but not sufficient, condi-
tions for such a government.3 39
337. The unwillingness or inability of the political branches to accommodate their conflicting budgetary pri-
orities led to passage of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings with all of its inadequacies. See R. EISNER, supra note 306, at
158-60; C. WEBBER & A. WILDAVSKY. A HISTORY OF TAXATION AND EXPENDITURE IN THE WESTERN WORLD
610-12 (1986); Schneider, The Political Legacy of the Reagan Years, in THE REAGAN LEGACY 51, 85 (S. Blu-
menthal & T. Edsall eds. 1988).
338. See, e.g., Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power to Counter Judicial Doctrine,
21 GA. L. REV. 57, 98-101 (1986); Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61
N.C.L. REV. 587 (1983).
339. See D. MOYNIHAN, The "New Science of Politics" and the Old Art of Governing, in CAME THE
REVOLUTION 301, 307 (1988); J. TULIS, supra note 66, at 42.
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